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PREFACE 
All of the great leaders have had one characteristic 
in common: it was the willingness to confront 
unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in 
their time. This, and not much else, is the essence 
of leadership. 1 
Labor and management in the steel industry have been and 
remain historically in conflict with each other. This 
conflict has usually erupted into strikes and government 
intervention. The mid-1940's were a time when both parties 
were trying to develop a working and living relationship. 
Individuals involved in labor-management situations have 
historically been "unique individuals." They have been 
leaders who have been able to create a vision and inspire 
others to share that vision. These are the types of leaders 
of which history is made. If one were to do a study on any 
one particular person, be it management or labor, during these 
early years, there would be many individuals who would have 
interesting and exciting stories to tell. 
The steel industry was very volatile between 1939-1944. 
Inland Steel was no exception. Strikes and workers discontent 
1John Kenneth Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin co., 1977), 330. 
ii 
were the product of the environment. The workers were 
responding to managements' demand to increase production, with 
a lack of concern for the person. The companies, in turn were 
responding aggressively to employee demands. The union's 
success in organizing the steelworker was due to the fact that 
the working conditions were poor. Wages, benefits, safety and 
the racial integration in the workforce were all major issues 
which needed to be addressed. These were, however, ignored 
by management. Inland Steel's was very dictatorial. 2 Due 
to a high turnover rate in management during the years 1939-
1944, employees' morale and trust in the company was virtually 
non-existent. The Chicago plant had six managers during this 
time period. In a two year time-span, the plant had ten 
personnel managers. Management instilled the belief in 
supervisors that the best way to maintain productivity and 
discipline was to have employee's afraid of losing their 
jobs. 3 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution 
of labor-management relations, industrial policies and race 
relations at Inland Steel, from 1945-1969. Other policy 
issues, such as those of wages and social insurance programs 
(e.g. accident pay, life insurance, pensions, etc.), deserve 
further investigation. These issues however, are not 
2William Foote Whyte, Pattern For Industrial Peace (New 
York: Harper & Bros., 1951), 157. 
3 Ibid. I 8. 
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examined in this thesis.• 
This thesis was initially intended to be a biographical 
oral history of Mr. William G. Caples who was employed at 
Inland steel from 1945, until his retirement in 1969. Due to 
his untimely death, the focus changed to an examination of 
labor-management and race relations policies in the steel 
industry, and in particular, an oral historical study of 
Inland Steel. Several former Inland employees were 
interviewed. 5 The information gathered from these interviews 
highlighted the fact that Inland's success story in the area 
of race relations was due to the commitment of upper 
management and to those individuals willing to take risks, 
such as Mr. Caples. Mr. Caples, with upper management's 
support, developed the mechanisms to address the race 
relations problems regarding the integration of the workforce 
4The author recognizes the fact that during this time 
period the strikes which occurred were many times economic. 
From 1937-1961 wages were the focal point of contract 
negotiations. ("Inland Steel wage chronology," typewritten 
(revised/updated to April 15, 1963) Section I, 1-12.) The 
issue of pensions and other social insurance programs being 
subject to collective bargaining were also of great importance 
and merit in-depth studies unto themselves. For example, 
Inland's case on pension's is one which is well documented 
because it was the case which decided pensions would be 
subject to collective bargaining. (Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 
77 NLRB 1, enforced 170 F.2d 247 (1948), cert. denied, 336 
U.S. 960 (1949). 
5Pete Calecci, interview by author, 2 August 1989, East 
Chicago, IN, tape recording; Frank Cassel, interview by 
author, 4 October 1989, Evanston, IL, tape recording; Bill 
Dillon, interview by author, 8 September 1989, Chicago, IL, 
tape recording; Bill Lowry, interview by author, 13 July 
1989, Chicago, IL, tape recording. 
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at Inland steel. Mr. Caples paved the way for change, as did 
other national leaders. It is human nature to remember the 
George Wallace's and issues like segregation and the nightmare 
of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. People like 
Dr. King left us a legacy and had a major effect on the 
evolution of race relations in this country. On a smaller 
scale there were many other individuals who were also paving 
the way for the changes which came about. William G. Caples 
was one of these individuals. 
Mr. Caples joined Inland in 1945, just as management and 
the union were beginning to develop a more cooperative 
relationship. He played a significant part in changing the 
relationship between union and management into more of a 
positive one. Mr. Caples also played a major role in the 
evolution of race and industrial relations policies which were 
beginning during this time period. One year after Mr. Caples 
was hired into the position of Staff Assistant to the 
President, he became the first Industrial Relations Manager. 
His goal was to assist in the development and implementation 
of labor relation policies and to improve the company's 
relationship with the Steelworkers union. Having been Staff 
Assistant to the President, he had the support of top 
management. The relationship Inland developed with the 
Steelworkers union was one which involved both parties 
commitment to work together and give all workers an equal 
opportunity. 
v 
In examining industrial relations policies, one must take 
into account not only the people involved, employees, 
government, management and union leadership, but also the 
industrial relations system itself. Because the focus of this 
thesis centers around the steel industry, and Inland Steel, 
the industrial relations system and the environment in which 
it evolved is explored. This thesis is an in-depth 
examination and analysis of the industrial relations system 
at Inland Steel. Race relations during this time period are 
also explored in relationship to labor-management relations 
and industrial relations policies. The external environment 
played a major role in the evolution of labor-management 
relations, but if it had not been for the foresight, vision 
and innovation of individuals such as William Caples, changes 
would have taken much longer. 
Many events occurred which led to the integration of the 
workforce in the steel industry. The Steelworkers Organizing 
Committee (SWOC) held their first convention on December 14, 
1937. 6 Delegates adopted eight objectives for the swoc. The 
first one was as follows: 
To unite in one organization, regardless of race, 
creed, color or nationality, all workmen and working 
women eligible for membership, employed in and 
around iron and steel manufacturing, processing, and 
fabricating mills and factories of the American 
6Vincent D. Sweeney, United Steelworkers Of America: 
-=T"""w...,.e"""n .... t...,y.___,Y .... e~a=r=-=s-=L=a...,.t ... e'-=-r ( Pittsburgh: United Steel workers of 
America), 40. 
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continent. 7 
It was several years later that the government took 
action in the employment area. on June 25, 1941, President 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which established a 
Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEP) to "receive and 
investigate complaints of discrimination" and to "take 
appropriate steps" to obtain compliance.' In 1942, the 
congress of Industrial Organizations established a Committee 
to Abolish Racial Discrimination. 9 That same year, when the 
swoc became the United Steelworkers of America not one black10 
steelworker was appointed to any major position in the 
international union. 11 At this same convention, more than 
twenty locals submitted resolutions against discrimination in 
the mills and Jim Crow laws in the South. 12 At the same time 
they were adopting these anti-discrimination resolutions, they 
were providing black delegates with a list of "colored 
7Ibid., 42. 
'Herbert Hill, Black Labor And The American Legal System 
Volume I: Race. Work. and the Law (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 
of National Affairs, 1977), 179. 
9Phillips s. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker 
1619-1973 (New York: Praeger, 1974), 256. 
10Black - a person with origins in any of the black racial 
groups of Africa. 
11Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 263. 
12Paul F. Clark, Peter Gottlieb and Donald Kennedy, eds., 
Forging a Union of Steel (New York: ILR Press New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1987), 60. -
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hotels." These are but a few examples of how unions and the 
government manifested their feelings, real or not, against 
racism. 
The CIO had a stronger stand against racial 
discrimination than the AFL and did not exonerate unions which 
excluded minority workers. By 1944 the black union members, 
desiring the same considerations in the workplace as the white 
union members, were ready for a change. Both unions and 
companies began to develop more of a "social conscience." 
some felt hiring blacks was the right thing to do, while 
others were forced to abide by the laws which were passed. 
In any case, changes began, but they could not have been made 
without the support and guidance of individuals. At Inland 
Steel Mr. Caples lead the drive for change. Yet in a 
corporate environment, behind every such leader is the 
support, or lack thereof, of the corporation. 
This research project is different from others, in that 
it is an oral case history of Inland Steel. Mr. William 
Caples and the management at Inland Steel made a contribution 
during this time. The policies Mr. Caples assisted in 
formulating and implementing in the industrial relations and 
human resources area and the situation at this company after 
1948, have not been documented. In Pattern For. Industrial 
Peace ( 1951), William Foote Whyte wrote about labor-management 
relations between Inland and the local steelworkers union. 
This however, only covered the period 1937-1948. This thesis 
viii 
will cover the years between 1945-1969 which were a turning 
point in labor-management and race relations policies, both 
in the steel industry, and at Inland Steel. It was during Mr. 
Caples tenure that a more positive relationship between the 
steelworkers union and management developed. David McDonald 
wrote "Inland was the maverick of the steel industry, an 
independent company with individual attitudes. 1113 Whether it 
was establishing eight hour work days when the industry was 
not yet prepared to do so, or whether it was the last one to 
agree or disagree in matters regarding collective bargaining, 
Inland did make changes. These changes could not have 
happened without people who were committed and William Caples 
was one of these individuals. 
13David J. McDonald, Union Man (New York: E. P. Dutton & 
Co . , 19 6 9 ) , 3 o 4 . 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
PRIOR TO 1945 
Industrial relations in the steel industry evolved 
dramatically up to 1945. These early years of the industry 
set the stage for what was yet to come. Thomas Kochan, and 
John T. Dunlop have both done comprehensive research and 
published extensively in the industrial and labor relations 
area. 14 John T. Dunlop deserves mention because he coined the 
phrase "industrial relations. 1115 Dunlop, as Kochan, provides 
a theoretical framework to better understand the workings of 
the industrial relations system. Kochan however, has one 
14See, for example, John T. Dunlop and Neil W. 
Chamberlain, eds., Frontiers in Collective Bargaining (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1967); Thomas A. Kochan, Collective 
Bargaining and Industrial Relations, (Homewood, IL: Richard 
D. Irwin, 1980); Thomas A. Kochan, Daniel J. Mitchell and Lee 
Dyer, eds., Industrial Relations Research In The 1970' s Review 
And Appraisal (Madison: Industrial Relations Research Assoc. , 
1982); Harry c. Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor 
Relations in the U.S. Auto Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1985); John T. Dunlop, "The Development of Labor 
Organizations: A Theoretical Framework, 11 in Insights into 
Labor Issues, Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister, eds., (New 
York: MacMillan Co., 1948), 163-193. 
1~ohn Thomas Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New 
York: Holt, 1958). 
1 
2 
major criticism with Dunlop's model. He believes Dunlop 
originally allowed for the absence of a "shared ideology. 1116 
Kochan also contends that Dunlop failed to pursue this in any 
of his later research.ll Kochan states that Dunlop's later 
research provides analysis and sets forth the assumption that 
a shared ideology prevailed in the post-New Deal environment 
in the United States. 18 Kochan emphasizes that it is the 
absence of a shared ideology which explains the changes of the 
United States industrial relations systems over time. 
The framework of both of these theories do have some 
similarities. Kochan, as Dunlop, considers how the external 
environment affects the relationship. They both identified, 
(1) technology, (2) labor markets and (3) public policies as 
being a part of the setting in which industrial relations 
systems interact. 19 Kochan has added to this ( 4) workforce 
characteristics and values and (5) product markets. Figure 
1 is Kochan's model of the framework which he uses. One can 
16Shared ideology is a set of similar beliefs, ideas or 
values which are shared by people. In corporations 
individuals are equally committed to the company's goals and 
objectives. 
17Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems, Ft. Note 7, 254. 
19Ibid. , and Thomas A. Kochan, Harry c. Katz and Robert 
B. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 11. 
- 1 
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2°Kochan, The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations, 11. 
3 
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see that it is much more extensive and thorough because it 
incorporates the external environment, values, history and 
business strategies. It also allows for responses to certain 
actions taken in the external environment and how these in 
turn affect what the final outcome will be in any given 
situation. 
Dunlop has also identified three "acto;rs" which need to 
be present in any industrial relations system: (1) managers, 
( 2) workers and ( 3) government agencies. ll Due to their 
interaction in the environment, these "actors" are the 
catalysts in the evolution of an industrial relations system. 
Kochan has also identified these three characters, but has 
further divided them into a "three tier institutional 
structure." In this structure each of the three characters 
or "actors" are divided into three levels: (1) the top level, 
which does the long-term planning and policy making; (2) the 
middle level which does the collective bargaining or personnel 
policy making; and ( 3) the lower level, which are those 
affected by the policies on a day-to-day basis.ll 
Steel Industry and the Industrial Relations System: 
Kochan's Model 
The steel industry's industrial relations system can best 
be understood and analyzed by using Kochan' s model. The 
uDunlop, Industrial Relations systems, 7. 
llKochan, The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations, 16. 
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interaction among employers, the union and government can be 
best explained when one considers the environment and events 
which have taken place. Going one step further, Kochan' s 
three tier structure provides for a much clearer picture of 
how the three levels in union, companies and government 
developed and carried out policies. 
The industrial relations system of the steel industry was 
formed in the late 1800's, when competition was intense and 
technology was rapidly progressing. It was a time when 
steelmakers concerns were costs and improvements; labor was 
looked on as a cost of production; and trade unions were 
becoming established while meeting more resistance in the 
steel mills. During its early years of expansion, the steel 
industry depended on a supply of cheap labor. Prior to World 
War I, much of this need in the North was met by European 
immigrants and in the South it was met with the black worker. 
In 1907 it was reported that blacks made up 39.1 percent of 
all the steelworkers in the South as opposed to 1.5 percent 
in the East and O. 5 percent in the Midwest. 23 Between 1908 and 
1913 companies now had a stable workforce and had initiated 
safety and welfare programs, thus successfully keeping unions 
out. As unions grew weaker, mechanization also increased, in 
turn making the skilled working man replaceable. Advancement 
23Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, The Black Worker 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 246, as cited 
in the Report of the United States Commission on Immigration, 
1907, Vol. 8, 34. 
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was reaching a level where it no longer depended on experience 
or special skills, so the union could offer no protection to 
those being replaced by machines. 
world war I changed the situation. As immigration 
slowed, the labor shortage increased, causing worker unrest 
and strikes. One way steel companies tried to decrease this 
labor shortage and alleviate the situation was to increase 
wages. This was not successful because it did not keep up 
with the economy. Companies looking for another source of 
labor, found it with the black migrant worker. Integrating 
the black worker into companies with a predominantly white 
workforce was to become a major concern. It would take many 
years and several pieces of legislation before the black 
worker would experience some semblance of equality in the 
workplace and in unions. 
Steel mills had some experience with the black worker 
because in the past, blacks frequently had been employed as 
strikebreakers. 24 A few were retained after the strikes in the 
mills. The mills began recruiting in the South, and it was 
at a time when the Southern black was ready to migrate. In 
1914 black agricultural workers in the South were earning 
$1.13 per day. 25 These low wages, along with the living and 
2•oaniel Guerin, 100 Years of Labor in the USA (London: 
Ink Links, 1979), 145-153. 
25U.S. Census Bureau, statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 1920 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920), 303. 
7 
farming conditions and the racial discrimination were the 
impetus to go North. In many instances, company officials 
feared the reaction of white employees so these steel firms 
hesitated to hire these migrants. The employers who did hire 
them provided segregated housing with high rents and 
inadequate facilities. Blacks, considered to be inferior 
people, continued to be placed in positions requiring 
unskilled labor. 
Immigrants, who had been working in the steel mills since 
the late 1800's, began to be noticed by their employers. The 
continued labor shortage began to change the employers' 
attitude toward this steelworker. companies began to see the 
immigrant steelworker in a different light. As their status 
grew in the eyes of the employers, treatment towards them 
began to change. The opportunity to rent company houses was 
given to those who were seeking American citizenship. This 
in addition to English classes, and continued wage increases, 
proved to be successful attempts in making the immigrant a 
permanent employee. 
World War I and the Black Worker 
When the United States entered World War I in 1917, steel 
was a necessity and a labor shortage occurred. The war 
brought back the longer work schedules. Seven days of work, 
which had for the most part been eliminated by 1915, and the 
twelve hour day which had been somewhat restrict~d, were 
8 
utilized. Living conditions deteriorated and even though 
there were wage increases, they did not keep up with food, 
fuel and rent increases. By 1917 food costs had increased by 
fifty-seven percent, fuel twenty-four percent and housing by 
nine percent. 26 
President Wilson, sympathetic to the plight of the 
workers and the labor shortage, improved the possibility of 
unionization. 27 In April 1918, the War Labor Conference Board 
was created giving the workers the right to organize without 
interference from employers. Later that same year, the 
President transformed the Conference Board into the National 
War Labor Board, giving them the power to settle disputes in 
essential industries. The War Labor Policies Board completed 
the national labor program. Their purpose was to avoid 
disputes by standardizing wages, hours and conditions in war 
industries. 
The United States experienced a post World War I boom 
which lasted from 1919 to 1920. Many assumed this postwar 
prosperity would be permanent but economic conditions began 
to worsen. By 1920 8,881 businesses had failed, with 
liabilities of $295 million; and in 1921 this number increased 
26U. s. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 1925 (Washington, o.c.: GPO, 1925), 322. 
27Mel vin I. Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson 
Administration (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), 
258. 
9 
to 19,652 , involving $755 million. 28 With nearly 3.5 million 
people out of work, the country faced for the first time in 
many years, a serious problem of unemployment. 29 Steel 
companies resisted unions attempts, leaving steelworkers 
feeling they were betrayed. This discontent erupted into the 
strike of 1919 which began in September, 1919. 
Blacks, who had been migrating to the northern industrial 
areas, came from largely rural areas and had virtually no 
experience with unions. In October they began appearing in 
the steel companies as strike breakers. It is estimated that 
between 30-40 thousand were brought into the industry during 
this time. 30 The strike ended on January 8, 1920 with the 
steel companies winning. It was not until after this 
occurrence that efforts commenced to organize the black 
worker. 
The labor supply gradually started to increase, not only 
with blacks but also with Mexicans. That same year the census 
showed that blacks made up 11.4 per cent of the steel labor 
force in Illinois. 31 The importation of Mexicans also began 
28John D. Hicks, George E. Mowry, and Robert E. Burke, The 
American Nation, 4th ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1965), 471. 
30Richard B. Morris, ed. , Bicentennial History of the 
American Worker (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 
1976)' 170. 
31David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 266. 
10 
to spread in the steel industry. By 1925, they made up 11.7 
percent of the steel workforce in the Chicago district, 
providing the industry with more than an adequate unskilled 
labor group. 32 The employment situation improved to what it 
had been prior to World War I. There was again a new group 
of unskilled workers and movement upward in jobs. The 
worker's dependence on management for jobs was as it had been 
in the past. There was an oversupply of unskilled workers and 
a shortage of demand for unskilled workers, thus steel 
companies were again in power. 
National Industrial Recovery Act 
In 1933 Franklin Roo~evelt confronted the Depression when 
he came to office. One of his priority's was to devise a new 
federal relief policy program. The government again got 
involved through the passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. 33 President Roosevelt described 
this piece of legislation as being a cooperative effort where 
labor and companies could participate in order to facilitate 
the recovery of the national economy. The purpose of the Act 
was to increase the total national purchasing power and to 
restore jobs to the unemployed. It hoped to accomplish this 
33National Industrial Recovery Act, 1933 Public Law 67, 
73rd Congress June 16, 1933. National Industrial Recovery 
Act; Act of June 16, 1933, C.90, 48 Stat. 195, 196; 15 u.s.c. 
703. The Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional in 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
11 
by: ( 1) reducing working hours with the intention of 
increasing employment; (2) increasing wages; (3) encouraging 
collective bargaining through representative of employees own 
choosing; (4) allowing industries to coordinate, eliminate 
unfair competition, and introduce some measure of economic 
planning. 34 In return for the government holding back the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 35 employers were to increase wages and 
extend labor the right to organize. 
Under the NIRA, each industry, through its trade 
associations, wrote codes which they presented to the National 
Recovery Administration for approval. It was assumed that 
each code would be the product of the given industry, with 
input from management, labor and the consumer. However, this 
was not to be the case. It soon became clear that the codes 
were to be developed by the industry. The provision 
pertaining to wages was very involved. The industry 
established rates of pay which varied from district to 
district. Their reason for these wage differentials were 
stated in the code as being due to the difference in the cost 
of living and economic conditions of certain areas. The 
Administration had been forced to compromise on several 
34H.R. Cayton and G.S. Mitchell, Black Workers and the New 
Unions (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1939), 90. Also see Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal 
System. 
35Sherman Act, 26 stat. 209 ( 1890), as amended, 15 U. s. c. 
§ § 1 et seq. ( 19 8 2 ) . 
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points. When the steel companies expressed their willingness 
to include Section 7A into their code, the Administration 
accepted the wage differential. 
In May 1935, the courts ruled the NIRA unconstitutional36 
and this was followed one month later by the passage of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 37 which reformulated Section 7 (A) 
of the NIRA. The NLRA authorized the creation of the National 
Labor Relations Board, who would: 
have the power to certify unions 
as exclusive bargaining agents; 
to order elections among competing 
unions so that workers could choose a 
collective bargaining agent or "no union"; 
and to insure that after a union was 
certified as the exclusive representative, 
employers legally obliged to recognize 
the union would engage in collective 
bargaining. 38 
Black leaders insisted that a clause barring racial 
discrimination be included in this section of the Act. During 
this time the closed shop, also known as a union shop, 
provided that all men employed in a plant had to join a union 
either at the time of employment or soon after. Blacks feared 
a new law legalizing a closed shop, would require employers 
to hire only union members. The closed shop did not interfere 
36Schecter Poul try Corp. v. U.S. , 295 U.S. 495 ( 1935). 
37National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), 49 
Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 65 Stat. 
601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959); 29 
u.s.c. Sections 151-68 (1970). 
38Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal System 104. 
13 
with an employers right to hire or fire, but blacks felt if 
an anti-discrimination clause were not included, it would lead 
to their being denied union membership. This would be the 
same as denying them employment. In the end the anti-
discrimination clause was not included. 
In 1936 there were 85,000 black steelworkers, making up 
20 percent of the laborers and 6 percent of the operators. 39 
This time the National Negro Congress felt the best way to 
help the black steelworker was by organizing and the Steel 
Workers Organizing Committee welcomed their support. At their 
first convention one of the items on their agenda was to agree 
' 
to organize the steelworker regardless of race, color, creed, 
nationality or sex. 40 By the end of 19 3 7 , the SWOC was 
bargaining for 550,000 steel workers, in addition to which it 
now had the largest group of black union workers in the United 
States. 41 It succeeded in increasing wages, reducing work 
hours and in some parts of the steel industry, it put an end 
to Jim Crow practices. Instances such as this would pave the 
way for the integration of the workforce. 
World War II 
World War II brought a boom in industry . as defense 
efforts got underway. The defense industries absorbed all 
39Foner, organized Labor and the Black Worker, 218. 
40Sweeney, United Steel workers of America, 4 o. 
41Ibid., 224. 
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available white worker's yet their color ban remained. Many 
labor unions in the defense industries would not admit blacks. 
Management with closed-shop agreements42 would turn down black 
applicants for being nonunion. A. Phillip Randolph who had 
been president of the National Negro Congress, created the 
March On Washington Movement in 1941. 43 By May of that year, 
March on Washington Committees had been organized in 
Washington, New York and Chicago. This march was in protest 
of the discrimination blacks had been encountering in the 
working environment. The march was eventually called off, but 
only after President Roosevelt pledged that executive action 
would be enacted. On June 25, 1941, he issued Executive Order 
8802, barring discrimination in the defense industries and 
also establishing a five-member Fair Employment Practice 
Committee. 44 On May 27, 1943, Executive Order 9346 reorganized 
the FEPC and expanded its jurisdiction beyond the defense 
industries, to include virtually all businesses which in any 
way affected the national interest. 45 
The Committee had no enforcement powers, it only 
42Such agreements are now unlawful. See, for example, 
Charles J. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor 2d ed., 
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1983) 
43 Jack M. Bloom, ..,.C=l""a""'s'""s""' . __'""'R .... a'""'c"""e=---. -=a=n=d.___,,t=h....,e,___.C=i~· v......=i=l-=R=i._g""'h._.t=s 
Movement (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1987), 78. 
"Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal system-, 179. 
45Ibid. 
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investigated complaints against employers and unions. It 
literally faced defiance from both unions and employers until 
its demise on June, 1946. Many of the unions ignored the 
committee or openly defied it. The end of the war saw the 
FEPC further weakening, with unions opposing the establishment 
of a permanent FEPC. Southerners had enough political clout 
to defeat the legislation creating a permanent committee. In 
the long run, the FEPC had very little effect on unions. It 
had no power whatsoever to enforce compliance. Due to the 
fact it had no authority or support from Congress, it was 
never accepted by employers, unions or the public. 
In 1942 the National War Labor Board was charged with the 
responsibility of settling all labor disputes which involved 
a threat to national security. 46 This same year the SWOC 
became the United Steelworkers of America. The black caucus 
to the convention sought to elect a black to the international 
office, but were unsuccessful. The South continued 
discrimination of blacks, with the local steelworkers CIO 
union doing little to improve racial equality. The CIO, even 
though it had taken a stand on discrimination, did very little 
in overseeing the unions enforcement of the policy. 
Discrimination in employment, hiring, wages and promotion 
continued. 
46U. s. National War Labor Board, The Termination Report 
of the National War Labor Board (Washington, D. C. : GPO, 
1947), 5. (hereinafter cited as Termination Report). 
16 
The government continued to become involved companies and 
unions. Collective bargaining changed during this time, when 
industry-wide bargaining began to take place. Up until the 
beginning of World War II, union and management were the two 
parties involved in collective bargaining, but now the 
government comes into the picture as the third party. This 
comes on the heals of the Little Steel Case .. 
The Little Steel Case involved Bethlehem Steel, Inland 
steel, Republic Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. The SWOC 
gained bargaining rights in these plants in 1941 and 
immediately began conducting separate negotiations with each 
of these companies. Negotiations continued and eventually 
went before the War Labor Board on July 16, 1942 where the War 
Labor Board heard the cases as one. One of the major issues 
was wages. When the War Labor Board handed down their wage 
formula for the small steel companies, it became known as the 
"Little Steel" formula, which would set the future wage 
pattern for the larger steel companies. 
Steel Industry's Industrial Relations System 
In examining the steel industry from the late lSOO's up 
to the mid-1940's, the three factors which Kochan has 
identified become more pronounced. Their interaction in the 
environment during certain periods of time begins to present 
a clearer picture of the evolution of the steel industry's 
industrial relations system. 
17 
The industry, the first factor, went through a number of 
transformations. Production in the late 1800's increased due 
to the demand for steel. By the 1920 's several steel 
companies have consolidated and production capacity continuing 
to expand. Then during the 1930's, during the Depression, 
production fell until 1940 when demand again increased with 
the start of World War II. It was in the environment of the 
1930's, when people were being laid off and wages were being 
cut, that unionization in steel began to emerge. In the 
1940's the pendulum swayed the other way putting the steel 
industry back on top. 
Another factor is the worker. In the 1800's the steel 
industry is made up of skilled workers, hired into key 
positions, in the production process. These are highly 
skilled individuals desperately needed by the employers. As 
mechanization and division of labor increased, steel 
production grew and companies became more powerful. This 
increase in mechanization meant the need for the skilled 
worker was not as great as it had been. The introduction of 
new machinery, a greater number of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers, all played a major role in reducing the power of the 
skilled worker. This new large pool of unskilled workers are 
what unified the workforce and set the stage for an industrial 
union. In addition the Depression and the changes Franklin 
D. Roosevelt made under the New Deal, paved the way for the 
swoc. 
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This momentum in the union movement was a product of the 
economical, social and political environment of the 
Depression. This was a time of layoffs, unemployment and 
those who did continue to work could expect a cut in wages. 
The black workers, not yet integrated into the workplace or 
the unions, were the first to be laid off. As workers grew 
more and more disenchanted, union organizing began to take 
place. 47 
Due to increasing industrialization there was a shift in 
black migration from farms to cities. 48 These individuals 
became the unskilled worker. The swoc, with the aid of the 
National Negro Congress, brought blacks to the union. Even 
though they were now in the unions, they were faced with 
discrimination. Racial discrimination was at every corner. 
The government passed laws against discrimination, which 
unions and businesses were required to follow, and they in 
47For reasons as to why employees JO.ln unions see for 
example, P.B. Beaumont, Change in Industrial Relations: The 
Organization and Environment, (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
Charles c. Heckscher, The New Unionism: Employee Involvement 
in the Changing Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1988). 
Diane Watson, Managers of Discontent (New York: Routledge, 
1988. Donald M. Wells, Empty Promises: Quality of Working 
Life Programs and the Labor Movement (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1987). 
0 See, for example, James R. Grossman, Land of Hope: 
Chicago. Black Southerners. and the Great Migration (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989); and for a discussion of 
the black worker and the problems they faced in employment 
and with unions see, Robert B. Grant, The Black Man Comes to 
the City: A Documentary Account from the Great Migration to 
the Great Depression. 1915-1930 (Chicago: Nelson Hail Co., 
1972), 82-124. 
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turn incorporated these laws into their respective policies. 
Despite the evolution of legislation many union constitutions 
proceeded to prohibit black membership. 49 
The government is the third factor that effected the 
steel industry's industrial relations system. The government 
went from a hands-off approach, to passing legislation giving 
it power to intervene and act as an arbitrator. The laws 
reflect the changing climate. The government has now run the 
gamut of no involvement to total involvement. 50 This third 
"factor" acted according to whatever issues needed to be 
addressed at any given time. 
Companies responded to the growing need of steel by 
increasing their mechanization. This, in turn, affected the 
labor, prompting the National Labor Relations Act. Kochan's 
model allows for the interactions of these three factors at 
each level. The evolution of labor-management relations is 
better understood and a sketch of the picture of their future 
course has now been painted. 
Kochan' s three factors and labor-management relations are 
at the core of how race relations policies evolved. No policy 
can be developed or implemented in a vacuum. It takes people, 
49Many union constitutions prohibited black members. See, 
for example, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 
323 U.S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed. 173 (1944). 
50See Termination Report, 6 where William H. Davis, Chair 
of the National Defense Mediation Board expresses a word of 
caution regarding government involvement in labor disputes. 
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interaction and events to be the impetus for any type of 
change. Kochan's model takes all of this into consideration 
and leaves room for growth. 
1945 to 1969 were years in which many changes occurred 
in the area of civil rights and the integration of the 
workforce. At Inland Steel the major factor was new 
management that was committed to equal rights. The 
individuals they hired, such Mr. Caples, shared their goals 
of making Inland a company where all employees would be 
respected and treated as equals, in every facet of their work. 
Unions and their policies of integrating black members 
also evolved during this time period. In most instances, this 
was due to the laws which were passed mandating unions and 
employers to abolish their discriminatory policies. As Kochan 
has identified, the external environment and the pressures 
which ensued were the most critical factors in the development 
of the steel industry's industrial relations system and race 
relations policies. 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND OF STEEL INDUSTRY PRIOR TO 1945 
overview of Steel Industry 
Generally, blacks were used as strikebreakers in all 
industries, and the steel industry was no exception. 
Employers imported blacks during strikes. This was an 
advantage to employers becaus~ blacks primary concern was to 
find work. Because they were not effected by public or 
unions' opinion regarding unionization, they had no qualms of 
acting as replacements. The jobs blacks held in the South did 
not pay as well as working in factories. When the opportunity 
arose for them to make more money they took advantage of the 
situation. Another advantage was that employers could adopt 
lower wage scales because it was difficult for blacks to find 
employment. Yet with the passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act and the new recognition which unions received, 
management was forced to view employees in a new light. The 
two main reasons blacks were affected were: (1) because they 
were part of the labor force and (2) because they were part 
of the labor force which was more likely to be taken advantage 
of by both management and unions. 
21 
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Prior to employing blacks, the labor supply was mainly 
drawn from Europe. Blacks had been used in northern steel 
plants as strike breakers during the period 1875-1914. In 
the south blacks were always a potential labor force, but were 
not used until industry, faced with a strike, was forced to 
do so. The United States experienced an extreme manpower 
shortage with the coming of World War I, forcing companies to 
use black workers. 
During World War I blacks began to enter all northern 
industries. Between 1910 and 1920, the black population 
increased in many of the major cities. In Detroit, the black 
population increased by 611.3 percent, Cleveland 307.9 
percent, Chicago 148.2 percent and in Pittsburgh 47.2 
percent. 51 The steel industry in Chicago employed black 
newcomers comparable to the meat packing industry. In 
Illinois, the black workforce in the steel industry increased 
from 35 in 1916 to 1209 in 1919. 52 In Gary, Indiana U.S. 
Steel's black workforce increased from 407 in 1916 to 1295 by 
1918. 53 
In the steel strike of 1919, the use of blacks as strike 
breakers reached its heights. It is estimated that 30,000 to 
51Cayton, Black Workers and the New Union, 6. 
52Grossman, Land of Hope, 184. 
53Ibid. 
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40,000 blacks were recruited as strike breakers.
5
' By 1920 the 
census said that 105,641 or 14.4 percent blacks were in the 
iron and steel industries." 
It is estimated that between the years 1920-1930 over 
1,000,000 blacks left their rural southern homes.% Some moved 
to cities in the south, but most migrated to the north. The 
demand for black workers was mainly in the steel plants. Of 
all the steel producing states, Illinois received the most 
migration of blacks. 57 
In 1921, the immigration law put a stop to most of the 
European labor supply, forcing northern industries to draw 
upon the south for unskilled labor. Blacks were brought into 
the lowest paid and most unpleasant jobs in the steel 
industry. As the length of residency in this country 
increased, there was a tendency for various nationality groups 
to rise in the occupational hierarchy and have jobs at the 
lower levels filled by the most recent immigrant groups. For 
example, the earliest immigrants, the English and Germans, 
were from Northern Europe and the first to enter industry. 
5'William Foster, The Great Steel Strike And Its Lessons 
(New York: B.W. Huebscsh, 1920), 207. 
55Department of Research and Investigations of The 
National Urban League, Negro Membership in American Labor 
Unions (New York: Alexander Press, 1930; repr., New York: 
Negro Universities Press, 1969), 14. 
56Cayton, Black Workers in the New Unions, 6. 
57Emmett J. Scott, Negro Migration During the War, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1920) 58. 
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Therefore, they were the first to rise from laborers to highly 
skilled and sometimes to executive positions. This 
occupational succession was slow for blacks, in addition to 
which there were limits to how far the black worker could 
rise. People rationalized keeping blacks in the most 
undesirable and unpleasant jobs, such as working in the open 
hearth, rolling or "hot" mills,~ because they believed the 
blacks could stand the heat better than the white men. Blacks 
faced discrimination at every turn. 59 Not only were they given 
few promotions, but they also faced displacement and 
unemployment. 60 Companies segregated blacks in housing, 
t 
lunchrooms and at work. 61 
Obstacles Steel Industry Faced in Unionizing 
The steel industry faced several major obstacles in 
attempting to unionize the steel worker: racial and ethnic 
58The rolling mills, also known as "hot mills", is the 
major process involved in steel manufacturing. The mill is 
hot and in this phase of the process a piece of steel weights 
from 30 to 3,000 pounds. The temperature during this time 
frequently exceeds 2000 Fahrenheit. In addition to heat 
generated by furnaces, equipment and the steel itself, the 
area is smoky and noisy. Alice Katherine Osborne, An 
Encyclopedia of the Iron and steel Industry (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1959), 356. 
59Robert c. Weaver, Negro Labor: A National Problem (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), 297. 
60Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I. 1917-
.1.2.2.l (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 13. 
61Grant, The Black Man Comes to the City, 124. 
25 
heterogeneity; wage spread; and company control of workers. 62 
The steel industry had a large number of ethnic groups 
in their workforce, and when the blacks and Mexicans began to 
arrive, this added to the already diverse ethnic work group. 
There soon came to be three and sometimes five major racial 
and ethnic categories: 
•Americans - descendants of the earlies.t immigrants 
which were the English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh, 
Germans and Scandinavians 
•Foreigners or "hunkies" - the later immigrants which 
were the Roumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, 
•Greeks, Italians and others from Eastern and 
Southern Europe 
•Blacks 
•Mexicans, which sometimes were the fifth group. 63 
Mexicans entered the steel industry as unskilled laborers 
and competed for jobs with blacks in the steel mills of the 
Pacific Coast, Colorado and the Calumet District in northern 
Indiana. The mixture of these races in the labor force 
divided the workforce as such, that it prevented the formation 
of any type of organization. 
The differences in wages were another reason there was 
no solidarity in the labor force. There were three levels of 
income among the steel workers: 
•Highly skilled were those which were involved in 
the making and rolling of iron and steel. Some 
of these jobs included smelters, puddlers, 
shearman, rollers, heaters, which were paid on a 
tonnage basis and received the highest wages in 
the plants. 
•Mechanical tradesmen were those in the standard 
62Cayton, Black Workers and the New Unions, 43. 
63Ibid. I 44 
crafts, such as brick layers, machinists, 
boilermakers, electrical workers. They received 
less than the skilled iron and steel workers, but 
more than the lowest group. 
•Semi-skilled operatives, unskilled laborers and 
maintenance men were considered to be the lowest 
paid worker. 6• 
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Whites generally made up the first category and 
foreigners, blacks and Mexicans were generally the majority 
of the last category. The skilled work~rs were able to 
maintain a higher standard of living and tended to identify 
themselves with the managerial class because they held the 
best jobs. For this reason, they were reluctant to become 
union members. 
In 1903, U.S. Steel began a program where employees could 
purchase company stock. Their purpose was to give the worker 
a stake in the company. Unskilled workers were not expected 
to buy stock, which further split the ranks of workers. 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube Company were among other companies which also began to 
implement such a program. 
The growth of unionism was also stifled by the steel 
companies' control over their workers. In many instances the 
workers lived on company owned property further strengthening 
Uibid. I 48. 
27 
the employer ties to the employees personal lives. 65 Companies 
also instituted such welfare programs as bowling leagues, 
visiting nurses, mutual aid societies, stock ownership, 
accident prevention programs and health and sanitation 
programs. Pension and group insurance plans also made the 
worker more dependent on the company. Workers with many years 
of service were reluctant to join the union for fear of losing 
their pension. There was also the fear that benefits of group 
insurance could be lost if employment in their plant were to 
cease. 
Another barrier to unions was the company union. The 
first large industry to use the Employee's Representative Plan 
was the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company which was organized by 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. after the coal miner's strike in 
1913. It was during this post-war period company unions 
became a way of fighting independent unions. The War Labor 
Board had established more than 200 shop committees in plants 
which had been producing items for the war. 66 As soon as the 
War Labor Board was dissolved, employers proceeded to also 
dissolve the committees and tried to substitute company unions 
for the shop committees. This was the time when company 
unions in the iron and steel industry were introduced. 
65For an in-depth study of the extent companies went in 
creating a forced dependency and dominating employees lives 
see for example, Walter H. Uphoff, Kohler on Strike: Thirty 
Years of Conflict (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 
66Cayton, Black Workers and New Unions, 58. 
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From 1919-1926, these employee representation plans were 
introduced to large industries, blacks were included. Blacks 
were familiar with this pattern of a relationship between 
employer and employee. The company unions wanted them, but 
the white unions did not. 
Unionization of Steel 
Union's attempts to organize the steel industry was 
significant to the integration of the workforce. In steel, 
the majority of the jobs were the skilled and unskilled jobs 
in the mills, which were the main areas of organization. It 
was not unusual that many of'the lower level, or unskilled 
jobs, were usually held by blacks. In addition to the 
discrimination faced in employment, blacks also faced 
discrimination in the unions. However, the history of 
unionization is important because the issues of the 
integration of the workforce and the racial policies which 
were eventually implemented by companies and unions blended 
together. A checks and balances system was created, whereby 
the two entities eventually used each other to enforce one or 
the other's anti-discrimination policies. 
Sons of the Vulcan 
In order for one to better understand why the steel 
industry treatment towards blacks evolved the way it did, one 
must look at the industry's history. Unionism in the steel 
industry dates back to 1858, which was when the Sons of Vulcan 
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was founded in Pittsburgh by a group of iron puddle rs. 67 
Discrimination in the steel industry had its roots here. When 
the union formed, it had a constitutional provision which 
barred blacks from becoming members. In 1862 the Sons of 
Vulcan formed a national organization called National Forge. 
on August 3, 1878, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel 
and Tin Workers was organized when delegates from the National 
Forge, the United Nailers and two smaller iron unions met in 
Emerald Hall in Pittsburgh and declared themselves an 
amalgamated body. Between 1880 and 1890, they succeeded in 
unionizing most of the iron mills in the Pittsburgh district. 
During these early years the Amalgamated was not 
interested in organizing blacks. The Sons of Vulcan policies 
had been carried over by its members. The Amalgamated did not 
go to the lengths the Sons of Vulcan had gone to by officially 
incorporating a clause barring blacks in their constitution, 
yet they did not officially favor organizing the black 
steelworkers. In 1881, blacks were admitted into the union, 
but not into white lodges. Separate lodges were thus created. 
67Puddling was a process used for making wrought iron. 
As pig iron was removed from the blast furnace it still 
contained impurities. Before the iron could be rolled into 
finished products these impurities had to be removed and the 
iron had to be made soft. This was accomplished in a large 
ovenlike structure called a puddling furnace. During this 
step of the iron-making process the iron was boiled, reduced 
to molten form and stirred constantly by the operator called 
a puddler. Thomas Southcliffe Ashton, Iron and Steel in the 
Industrial Revolution (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), 
87-95. 
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The first black lodge was the Garfield Lodge which was 
organized in 1887 in Pittsburgh. By 1888, the Amalgamated 
dominated the whole trade union movement and was the most 
powerful union in the United States. 
The unionization of steel continued to struggle. In 1901 
after the organization of the U. s. Steel Corporation, the 
Association thought it could organize workers in the non-union 
mills of this new corporation. There were meetings between 
union and management, but the union thinking it was more 
powerful, underestimated the operators. A strike, which was 
lost in two weeks, culminated with the union being forced to 
accept an agreement. This proved to be undesirable because 
it covered fewer mills than any of the earlier proposed 
settlements. The loss of this strike further weakened the 
union and after 1902, the union was forced out of the mills 
in the East. By 1909, steel unionism essentially ceased to 
exist. Attempts to organize steel again gained momentum 
during World War I. In 1918 at the American Federation of 
Labor convention plans were developed to begin a campaign to 
organize the industry, but efforts were not successful. 
The membership of the Amalgamated Association was 
composed largely of the skilled worker. The union became 
interested in the unskilled black worker only when forced to 
do so. The skilled white workers in the North feared 
competition from the skilled black workers which migrated from 
the South. Even though there were segregated locals the white 
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worker refused to work, or acknowledge the black worker. As 
union membership began to decline, the numbers of blacks in 
the steel industry began to increase. By the time the 
Association realized they needed the black worker to survive, 
it was too late. 
Knights of Labor 
In 1880 the Knights of Labor, an industr.ial organization, 
made attempts to organize all workers, both skilled and 
unskilled, regardless of race. They were the first to make 
efforts to organize blacks on a large scale. In 1886, when 
it was at its most powerful the Knights claimed they had 
60, 000 black members. 68 Their goals were twofold: to unite 
all workers regardless of race, creed, color, sex or national 
origin and to abolish what they termed "wage slavery. 1169 The 
Knights did not openly wage a campaign to end racism. 
Segregated locals continued and inequalities remained, but the 
Knights were the first to develop the principles of labor 
solidarity and racial equality. 
The Knights, spreading themselves too thin, began loosing 
power by trying to deal with too many issues at once. 
Attempting to establish an eight hour work day, increase wages 
and involvement in too many strikes, proved to be too much. 
68Ibid, 7 4. As cited in Footnote, Harris & Spero, "Negro 
Problem," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XI, 339. 
69Foster Rhea Dulles and Melvyn Dubofsky, Labor in 
Ainerica, 4th ed., (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 
1984), 122. 
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These factors, along with few full-time paid official without 
any real managerial experience was their downfall. By 1893 
they began loosing membership and anti-black members became 
the majority. The Amalgamated began to pick up where they 
left off and little by little black representation in the 
union continued to increase. 70 
The Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union 
During the latter part of the 1920's and early 30's the 
communist party had several industrial unions whose goal was 
to organize the masses of the unorganized worker, including 
all minorities. The Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union 
was one of these unions. This union differed from the 
Amalgamated Association in that it tried to organize the 
unemployed and draw them into the picket lines in case of 
strikes. Another difference was that their dues and fees were 
on a sliding scale, therefore individual's paid according to 
their earnings. 
The S.M.W.I.U. regarded organizing blacks as one of their 
major tasks. The membership book of the union stated it: 
... fights for full equality for the Negro workers -
both on and off the job. At all times the 
S.M.W.I.U. strives for the greatest possible unity 
70Labor agreements during this time provided for "white 
jobs" and "colored jobs." See, for example, Lamont E. 
Stallworth, "The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances: 
An Examination Into the Treatment of Sex and Race-Based 
Discrimination Grievances by Arbitrators Since World War II," 
(Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1980), 173-195. 
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in the struggles of all of the workers. 11 
The S.M.W.I.U. placed this emphasis on the black worker 
because according to the Communists, blacks were fighting to 
be liberated from the "capitalist-imperialist social structure 
in the United States" and would therefore make the best allies 
and "best fighters for the revolution." After the passage of 
the NRA the S.M.W.I.U. grew and did enjoy ~ome success, but 
it was not to last. Their downfall was the "red scare" which 
began taking place. 12 Employers and the government began 
directing campaigns against the S.M.W.I.U. Membership began 
declining when announcements were made that the "red," 
Communist unions were "un-American." Employers also refused 
to deal with the union on the grounds it considered itself a 
Communist organization. The s.M.W.I.U. was finally defeated. 
It disbanded with many of its members joining the Amalgamated. 
The NIRA and the Steel Code 
When the NIRA was passed in 1933 its purpose was to 
restore jobs to the unemployed and to increase the total 
national purchasing power. One of the provisions was to have 
71Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that 
Shaped American Unions (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977), 156. 
72In the mid-30's, amidst international aggression, the 
United States began perceiving anything foreign as a threat. 
The public became paranoid and took their fears out on aliens 
and communists. "Reds" were blamed for promoting subversive 
ideologies, the depression and labor unrest. Bruce J. 
Dierenfeld, Keeper of the Rules (Charlotte: University Press 
of Virginia, 1987) 76. .--$~-- --
/> 
/ 
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each industry write a code which would then be presented to 
the National Recovery Administration for approval. The 
Administration's goal was that these codes were to be written 
by management, labor and the consumers. However, this was not 
to be the case. What came to pass, was that the drafting of 
the codes soon came to rest with the employers. 
The steel Code was approved on August 19, 1933, and 
included wage differentials between the North and South. 
Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor at that time was 
firmly opposed to these differentials. 73 At the steel Code 
hearings before the National Recovery Administration on July 
31, 1933, Secretary Perkins is quoted as saying: 
The proposal to divide the country into 21 separate 
wage districts with differentials of 2 and 3 cents 
an hour needs to be very carefully examined. It has 
the appearance of an arbitrary fixing of wages that 
can hardly be justified by differences in costs of 
living. If separate wage zones are needed they 
should be established only after the most careful 
research; and the number of such zones should be 
strictly limited to a very few that are dictated by 
essential and substantial differences, and not by 
the mere fact that some employers may have been in 
a position to press the common labor rate down a 
few cents lower than others. If this is not done, 
one of the worst forms of unfair competition may be 
perpetuated, namely, that which is brought about by 
those who cut labor rates. An Industry that has 
been given the privilege of preventing unfair price 
competition must assume the responsibility also of 
73For a historical analysis of Frances Perkins life during 
her term as Secretary of Labor see for example, George Martin, 
Madam Secretary. Frances Perkins (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1976). Lilian Holmen Mohr, Frances Perkins. That Woman 
in FDR's Cabinet (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: North Rive~ Press, 
1979). Bill Severn, Frances Perkins: A Member of the Cabinet 
(New York: Hawthorn Books, 1976). 
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preventing unfair wage competition.n 
The Administration had compromised on other parts of the 
code. Thus, despite opposition, the Administration proceeded 
to accept the code and "overlook" the wage differential. 
The steel differentials varied in districts, but the North-
south differential was even greater. The lowest wage in the 
south was twenty-five cents an hour, whereas in the North it 
was thirty-five cents; the highest wage in the North was forty 
cents an hour and in the South it was twenty-seven cents. 75 
This North-South differential was directed towards blacks, but 
pressure from the steel industry and organized southern 
manufacturers further intensified the situation, and the 
Administration felt it was forced to make the concession of 
letting this wage differential stand. 
Codes from other industries also included this wage 
differential, such as the Cotton Textile Code, Petroleum Code. 
The Codes themselves did not create the wage differential. 
This wage differential existed because of the unequal 
bargaining power of labor in various parts of the country and 
among the different racial groups. Yet the codes did extend 
to the situation a formal recognition and the sanction of the 
federal government. 
1 'Cayton, Black Workers and the New Unions, 97. As quoted 
in the Transcript of the Corrections on the Analysis of the 
Steel Code by the Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, before 
the National Recovery Administration, July 31, 1933, p. 18. 
75Ibid. 
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In doing this the government opened the door to problems 
which still exist today, mainly because many of the written 
codes were done so arbitrarily and with the sole purpose of 
distinguishing the white and black labor force of an industry. 
An NRA official who was as equally concerned about the wage 
differential as Secretary of Labor Perkins was of the opinion 
that these differentials would eventually lead to job 
competitions between black and white workers. He too, agreed 
this would perpetuate the problem of exploiting labor, but 
more specifically it would have a greater negative impact on 
blacks. 76 
Other NRA staff members at the time felt the Recovery 
Administration itself was also prejudice to some extent. 
Despite negative reactions, the problems confronted by black 
workers were usually ignored by the NRA. Mr. John P. Davis, 
of the Joint Committee on Recovery wrote that officials of the 
NRA essentially were not serious about integrating the blacks 
into the workforce." He also made several important points: 
the first was that blacks had less than a dozen 
representatives in six hundred code hearings; in addition, 
the National Industry Recovery Administration employed 
approximately 1, 000 people, with no black indi victual above the 
Hibid., 100-101. 
"John P. Davis, "Blue Eagles and Black Workers," The New 
Republic, (November 14, 1934), 7. 
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rank of a messenger. 78 
The Division of Research and Planning employed Mabel Byrd 
to study the problems of black labor under the NRA. She was 
denied an off ice for four weeks at the NRA headquarters. When 
a spot was finally found for her, she was placed in a corner 
in which black census workers had been Jim-Crowed. 79 After 
several months she was notified that the study was being 
cancelled because it would be "preposterous" to have such a 
study done by a black. Ms. Byrd was convinced that the reason 
the study was cancelled was due to the fact that it would have 
unearthed discrimination against the black under the NRA. 
On May 31, 1934, the President signed an amended code for 
the steel industry. This amended version had virtually no 
changes on the most important point -- the Southern wage 
differential remained in force. In 1936 there were 85,000 
black steel workers, yet still in the lowest paying jobs.~ 
Their salaries still based on this North-South differential, 
78 Ibid o 
79The exact date of the origin of the term "Jim-crow" is 
unknown. The term was the name of a song which was written 
by Thomas D. Rice in 1832 and in 1838, it began to be used as 
an adjective. Writers began using this expression in the 
1890's when referring to the segregation of blacks, and the 
racism they confronted in all aspects of life. The roots of 
segregation and racial discrimination date back to the Civil 
War and slavery. Many historians believe that racial 
separation intensified after the end of slavery and became 
fully developed after the Reconstruction Act of March 1867. 
c. Van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3rd ed., 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 1-30. 
~Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 218. 
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averaged between $16 and $22 per week. 11 
Revival of Company Unions 
When the first Steel Code was adopted there were three 
unions seeking to attract the steelworkers: (1) the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Tin Workers; ( 2) the 
(Communist) Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union; and (3) 
company unions. 
Once the NIRA was passed, companies began to aggressively 
revive the company unions. In November, 1933, 45 percent of 
the workers (1,164,294 employees) in 3,314 steel plants, were 
under Employees Representation Plans. 12 This was a 218 percent 
increase of membership as compared with an increase ~f 125 
percent in the membership of organized labor unions. 83 It is 
estimated that by December of 19 3 3 , there were more than 
3,000,000 employees in company unions. 84 Some of the 
industries with strong company unions were: automobile, iron 
and steel, foundries, machine shops, electrical manufacturing, 
metal mining, petroleum refining, rubber products and farm 
machinery. 
The Employee Representation Plans were established to 
11Ibid. 
12Cayton, Black Workers in the New Unions, 104. 
83Ibid. 
14Ibid. 
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meet all of the qualifications of collective bargaining. 
Representatives were elected and committees established to 
meet once a month, with management representation on each 
committee. The plan, which could be amended, also provided 
for a grievance procedure. In many cases before a grievance 
could be submitted to an outside arbitrator or an amendment 
made, a majority vote of the committee had to be obtained. 
Because employee representation on the committees was 50%, 
this meant that a management representative would have to vote 
with the workers in order for there to be a majority vote. 
Employees supported these company unions, because they 
' 
feared for their jobs. Others did not understand the meaning 
of the plans. Once the SWOC came to power the ERP were the 
first items they attacked. Charges were filed with the NLRB 
against some of the larger corporations against this company-
union system. Eventually, the NLRB declared them to be 
illegal, forcing companies to dissolve them. 
The CIO and swoc 
At the 1934 AFL Convention, two resolutions were passed: 
(1) to conduct an organization campaign in the iron and steel 
industry and (2) that this industrial form of organization be 
applied to all basic industries. The Executive Council 
continued to protect the rights of the existing craft unions 
and did not wholeheartedly support the idea. The organizing 
movement thus proved to be unsuccessful. 
40 
Led by John L. Lewis, more pressure was exerted from the 
industrial block to have industrial unionism, at the 1935 
convention. Again, they were defeated by the craft group. 
The day after the convention the industrial bloc planned a 
conference for November 9, whereby they organized the 
committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). The CIO was 
composed of the following unions: the United Mine Workers, 
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the International 
Typographical Union, the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers, the Oil Field, Gas, Well & Refinery Workers, the 
United Hatters, Cap, Millinery Workers and the International 
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. 
In 1935 Lewis resigned as Vice-President of the AFL, and 
the CIO began their preparation to organize the workers in the 
iron and steel industry. To accomplish this goal, they formed 
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). In February, 
1936, Lewis offered the AFL $500,000 toward a fund of one and 
a half million, to organize the steel industry, along an 
industrial line, and not a craft line. 85 The AFL declined the 
proposal. The same proposal was made to the Amalgamated 
Association, and they accepted. The Steel Workers Organizing 
Committee was now organized to do the job Lewis had been 
wanting. 
85Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years: A History .of the 
American Worker 1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1969) I 441. 
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The swoc grew and by the end of 1937 was bargaining for 
550,000 steelworkers and had contracts with approximately 450 
steel companies. 86 That same year swoc was successful in 
organizing the U.S. Steel Corporation. Myron c. Taylor, Chair 
of the U.S. Steel Corporation and Lewis reached an agreement 
without a strike, making the CIO union the exclusive 
bargaining agent for "Big Steel" workers, yet it was a 
different story with the "little steel companies". This was 
a group of the smaller independent companies which consisted 
of: Bethlehem, Republic, Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Inland 
steel, which banded together to resist the union. The Little 
Steel Companies refused to sign a contract and on May 26, 1937 
a strike order, covering 75,500 workers in the plants of the 
independent companies in Chicago, Indiana Harbor, Youngstown, 
Canton, Massilon, Warren, Niles and Cleveland was issued. The 
most violent strike ended at Republic Steel's South Chicago 
Mill, with the Chicago Memorial Day Massacre where ten people 
were killed. 87 For the time being, the SWOC was defeated. 
After the strike, Republic, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and 
Bethlehem continued fighting against the union. The 
LaFollette Committee did an expose on the companies' 
involvement during this time period and the extent they had 
86Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 223. 
87Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars: From the Molly Maguires 
to the Sitdown (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1973), 319. 
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gone to in trying to crush the union. 88 After the report was 
made public Republic ended up paying $350, 000 in personal 
damage suits to 208 union members who had been injured." In 
addition, on August, 1939, the new Labor Relations Board 
ordered Bethlehem Steel to dissolve its Employee 
Representation Plan and to stop interfering with the swoc. 
similar findings were also the case with Yoqngstown Sheet and 
Tube and Republic, where strikers were reinstated with back 
pay. 
The SWOC held their first convention in 1937 and 
identified eight objectives of their union: 
1. To unite in one organization, regardless of 
creed, color or nationality, all workmen and 
working women eligible for membership, employed 
in and around iron and steel manufacturing, 
processing, and fabricating mills and factories 
of the American continent. 
2. To increase the wages 
conditions of employment 
legislation, conciliation, 
other legitimate means. 
and improve the 
of membership by 
joint agreement or 
3. To endeavor to obtain by joint negotiations or 
legislative enactment a six-hour day and five-
day week. 
4. To strive for a minimum wage scale for all 
members of the organization. 
88James J. Matles and James Higgins, Them and Us: 
Struggles of a Rank-and-File Union (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1974), 102-116. For an indepth discussion of 
the Chicago Memorial Day Massacre, also see, U.S. Committee 
on Education and Labor, The Chicago Memorial Day Massacre (New 
York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971). 
0 Sweeney, The United Steelworkers of America, 39. 
5. To provide for the education of the children 
by lawfully prohibiting their employment until 
they have at least reached 18 years of age. 
6. To secure equitable statutory old age pension, 
workmen's compensation and unemployment 
insurance law. 
7. To enforce existing just laws and to secure the 
repeal of those which are unjust. 
8. To secure by legislative enactment, laws 
protecting the limbs, lives and health of our 
membership; establish our right to organize; 
prohibiting use of deception to secure 
strikebreakers; preventing the employment of 
privately armed guards during labor disputes; 
and such other legislation as will be 
beneficial. 90 
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The SWOC knew if it were to be successful , then the 
black worker would have to be organized and it proceeded to 
do just that because officers of the SWOC were connected in 
some way to the United Mine Workers Union, which had more 
black members than any other labor group. Also by 1937, more 
black people were educated in union campaigns in addition to 
which at this time the CIO also endorsed by the National Bar 
Association of Black lawyers and judges and the National 
Negro Congress. 
In 1942, swoc changed their name to the United Steelworkers 
of America and they proceeded with their campaign of 
organizing the black steelworkers. They felt one way to do 
this was to get black organizers and just importantly to 
stress the union's nondiscriminatory policy. By the early 
90Ibid. I 43. 
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1940's SWOC claimed a black membership of 35,000 and by 1943, 
70 I 00091 
The SWOC did benefit the black steelworker. It 
increased their wages, decreased work hours and put an end to 
some of the Jim Crow practices in some parts of the steel 
industry. Yet, the "equal and fair treatment" which was 
needed for solidarity was lacking. Wage ~iff erentials and 
occupational discrimination both further entrenched job 
segregation. World War II opened up more jobs for blacks, 
but there were still many sections of the mills which were 
closed to them, including skilled positions. This 
segregation also resulted in blacks receiving less seniority9' 
and being the first ones to be laid off. 
Formation of The United Steelworkers of Ainerica 
At the 1942 convention the s.w.o.c. officially changed 
its name to the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). The 
issues concerning race in employment continued to remain 
unaddressed. The USWA, as other unions before them, also 
incorporated nondiscriminatory verbiage in their constitution. 
At this convention they passed a resolution: 
to fight to secure the equality of treatment for all 
nclark, Forging A Union Of Steel, 58. 
"See for example, EEOC v. International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n., 511 F.2d 273, 10 FEP 545 (5th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. 
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F. 2d 418, 457-58, 3 FEP 862, 
Reh. denied en bane, 451 F.2d 461, 4 FEP 2 (5th Cir• 1971), 
cert. denied sub nom.; Locomotive Engineers v. U.S. 406 U.S. 
906, 4 FEP 661 (1971). 
workers, Negro and white, and all races and creeds 
in industrial employment and promotion, in 
vocational training, in union leadership and 
service, in government and armed forces. 93 
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Race relations policies not only with the USWA, but also 
with many steel companies, continued to be symbolic. 
Mechanisms were now in place to begin correcting the gross 
injustices confronted by blacks. As legislation evolved and 
corporations' and the USWA's commitment to equal opportunity 
continued to grow, the integration of blacks in the workplace 
gradually emerged. It would take many more years before any 
real progress could be discerned. 
93Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro (New 
York: Harper & Bros., 1944), 185. As cited in Steel Labor, 
May 1942. 
CHAPTER 3 
BACKGROUND OF INLAND STEEL PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II 
Prior to signing a contract with what was then the 
Steelworkers Organizing Committee, Inland Steel had typical 
industry experiences. In the early 1900's the environment was 
not conducive to any type of union drives. Just as the steel 
industry resisted unionization - so did Inland. During union 
drives, the steel industry faced severe criticism by the AFL. 
One was that the U.S. Steel Corporation was becoming a 
monopoly and much too powerful, and the other was that the 
labor conditions in the mills were deplorable. 
In 1911 the Charity Organization Society of New York 
Launched its Pittsburgh Survey regarding working conditions 
at Bethlehem Steel. This spark touched off a strike with 
Bethlehem and was what the A.F. of L representatives needed 
to lead a striker's committee to Washington. Once there they 
demanded an investigation be made and a response be issued to 
the Survey. The steel industry was soon receiving scathing 
criticism, adding fuel to the fire. This same year, John 
Fitch published an article in the American Magazine entitled 
"Old Age at Forty," which became a battle cry for reform. 
46 
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The steel companies worked to counteract this adverse 
publicity and the first area they addressed was the high 
accident rate. The Illinois Steel Company coined the slogan 
"safety first," which soon came to be the steel industry's 
motto. Inland, like many others, responded by establishing 
a safety department, and by 1915 had reduced its accident rate 
by 55 percent. 94 A program was started to educate its 
employees on the issue of safety. Safety concerned all people 
in the workforce, many of which were immigrants. To 
accommodate those employees of different nationalities, it is 
interesting to note that safety signs in 1911 were printed in 
English, Croatian, Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian and Slavic. 95 
Companies began to concern themselves with their workers 
well-being, both in and outside the work environment. In 1914 
Inland organized the "Inland Fellowship Club" whereby more 
than 2, 000 ( 70 percent) of the Indiana Harbor employees 
donated ten cents each month towards a relief fund for 
families and unemployed Inland employees. 96 Inland donated all 
coal necessary for the relief of the employees, in addition 
to which, they employed a visiting nurse to provide and care 
for the employees' families. Many of the steel companies did 
94Brody, Steelworkers In America, 167. 
95Inland Steel Public Relations Department, "Inland Steel 
History," 1981(?), TMs [photocopy], p. 41, Inland Steel 
Research Library, East Chicago, Indiana. 
96Wade 
(Chicago: 
Grinstead, 50 Years of Inland Steel, 
Inland Steel Company, 1943), 42. 
1893-1943 
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this type of welfare work which steel companies to help quiet 
public criticism. Labor eventually stabilized and the roar 
of unionization subsided. Thus, going into World War I, 
working conditions had improved and the threat of organized 
labor was minimal. 
world War I 
But, World War I altered the environment. Inland, as 
other steel companies during the early days of the war, 
supplied steel to foreign nations. When the United States 
entered the war, this changed and all of the steel industry 
entered into full scale production in the war effort. Along 
with this full scale production came a labor shortage. As 
recalled by Frank Cassel: 
The Mexican worker who came to Inland Steel came 
essentially with World War I and by and large they 
were imports from the American side of the Mexican 
border. That was the first batch that came. They 
were Mexicans who had been working in the fields in 
Southern Texas and they were imported to Inland. 97 
In response to a question as to why Mexicans were recruited, 
Cassel further stated: 
IL. 
IL. 
Inland Recruited them for the war - as replacements. 
That's how the women got started in the mills. 
Women and Mexicans and to a substantial extent 
blacks, got started in the mills as a result of the 
labor shortage of white Anglos in World War I. It 
changed the complexion of the mills. 98 
97Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
98Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
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As the demand for labor increased the demands from the 
workers also increased. War triggered inflation and impacted 
employee unrest. As prices were driven up, the steel industry 
found that one way of dealing with the situation was to 
increase wages. The average hourly wage at Inland doubled 
between 1915-1918. Total Inland payroll, which was $4, 318, 977 
in 1915, more than tripled, reaching $14,55.9,291 in 1918. 99 
Post World War I and Renewal of Unionization Efforts 
These wage increases were deceptive because as wages 
increased so did housing and food. Between 1915 and 1918 
housing increased ten perceht and food prices escalated 
eighty-two percent. 100 All of these factors revived organized 
labor. When the war ended the doors to organize steel were 
opened, yet employers still fought back. Employee 
representation plans were used by employers as one way of 
thwarting unionism. After the war, Inland adopted shop 
committees whereby employees were elected to be on workers 
committees and councils. These committees dealt with managing 
grievances, and in some cases also dealt with general 
questions about hours and wages. Inland saw this employee 
representation plan as a way of providing "effective 
communication and means of contact .•• and to insure justice, 
"Inland Steel, The Story of Inland Steel (Chicago: 
Inland Steel Company, 1971), 9. 
100U. s. Census Bureau I statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 1925, 322. 
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maintain tranquility and promote the general welfare. 11101 
In addition to wage increases and the employee 
representation plans, companies began other welfare efforts. 
Inland, along with Carnegie, Bethlehem and Youngstown, 
announced expanded home building programs and in 1920 began 
building the Sunnyside Subdivision for its employees . 102 It 
also implemented a saving and profit sharing pension fund. 
Other companies formed cooperative clubs to counter the high 
cost of living and others bought food to sell at wholesale 
prices to their employees. This welfare capitalism had a 
soothing influence on the steel industry. 
Yet even though the environment was now relatively calm, 
the problem of finding unskilled labor evolved. The southern 
black worker had been a chief source of labor to the steel 
industry, but it was something that did not entirely please 
some of the steel men. The president of Inland thought "it 
would be better for the industry and the country at large if 
the mills could continue to recruit their forces from 
(Europe] . The negroes should remain in the south. 11103 
With unskilled workers in demand, the steel industry 
looked elsewhere and that elsewhere was the Mexican worker. 
Mexicans were recruited through employment agencies in San 
101Brody, Steelworkers of America, 227. 
102Inland Steel Public Relations Department, "Inland Steel 
History", 58. 
103Ibid. , 266. 
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Antonio, Texas and sent north via trains. The cost of 
transportation, food and the lodging in company houses were 
to be repaid out of future wages. Importing Mexicans in this 
manner became very widespread in the steel industry. This is 
not to say that blacks were totally excluded, but the minority 
group representation did change. According to the 1930 
census, the percentage of blacks worki~g in the steel 
industry, did not increase between 1920-1930. Yet 1930 
statistics show that in 1924 three of the major steel mills 
Mexicans made up 12.1 percent of the labor force and blacks 
14.3 percent, and in 1928 the situation was reversed, with 
14. 2 percent Mexicans and 11.1 percent blacks . 104 Thus, 
between the two minority groups the steel industry now had an 
adequate unskilled labor supply. 
Inland's Management Style 
In the 1930's the government's posture toward labor 
changed. The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
reinforced the rights of unions to organize. The environment 
at Inland Steel during this time was very hostile and ripe for 
a union. 105 The employees considered the management style to 
be a very dictatorial one. Workers even thought management 
104Paul s. Taylor, Mexican Labor In the u. S. : Chicago And 
The Calumet Region (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1932), 36. 
105whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, 1-18. 
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went out of its way to recruit people with no experience so 
that this way, they would not be familiar with any type of 
management style. A black worker at Inland described the 
company's hiring policy of the late 1930's in the following 
manner: 
If you was colored, you had to be straight from the 
South or they wouldn't hire you. You couldn't go 
in looking for work dressed up half way decent, like 
I am now. You had to go in with an old cap on the 
back of your head and a torn shirt and pants and 
carrying a paper bag under your arm. First thing 
the boss asked was, "How long you been in the city?" 
You answer, "I just got in," and he tells you you're 
hired. You tell him, "I been here all my life," and 
he won't have anything to do with you. 11106 
It was also management's belief that discipline and 
productivity could best be maintained through the employees 
fear of losing their jobs. Ed Snyder, a foreman during this 
time recalled one incident: 
Joe Smith would just as soon fire you as look at 
you. Art Thomas (Foreman) was so scared of Joe 
Smith that if he saw him coming he would dive right 
under those high bake ovens. The foreman had no 
security in all those days. 
Joe Smith fired one of our best workers on the line 
one day, and there wasn't anybody else who could do 
that job. He fired him just because he saw the man 
wearing a white shirt. The smiths had an idea that 
nobody that wore a white shirt could really work. 107 
The management at Inland had no regard for the employees. 
The company also had separate wage scales for men, women, 
blacks and whites. In the early 1930's the starting wage for 
106Whyte, Pattern For Industrial Peace, 7. 
107Ibid. , 8. 
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black women was 14~ cents an hour, for black men it was 16~ 
cents and white men 18 ~ cents . 108 During this time period 
there were 246 different pay rates for 600 employees •109 There 
were no job classifications and no formal wage structure 
system. It was in this time period the National Industrial 
Recovery Act established a forty hour work week, yet there 
were no provisions as to when these hours should be worked. 
A foreman at Inland describes the length of some of his days: 
Many a time I finished my 40 hours on Monday and 
Tuesday. Yes, I worked 20 hours a day on those 
days. When you came in in the morning, you'd meet 
yourself going home at night. 110 
unionization Efforts Gain Momentum 
The unionization effort at Inland began to grow. 
Employees' salaries and the treatment they experienced in 
their jobs looked to the union as the primary source to bring 
about change. Pete Calecci, a retired Inland Steel employee 
describes his career with the company: 
I'm Italian. Came to the U.S. 1930, when I was 
17. Started working at Inland in 1936. Retired in 
1978. 
For a period of time I maintained my service at the 
plant while I was working for the union. When the 
union position became permanent I was severed from 
Inland 1967. In 67 went with the union and retired 
108Ibid. 
109Ibid. 
110Ibid • I 9 • 
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in 78. 111 
calecci, one of the indi victuals who supported the union 
campaign, describes the type of people who were active in 
organizing the union at Inland: 
There were some of the old timers that built the 
union, that did suffer by discrimination, not being 
promoted because they did not brown nose with the 
foreman, but those people had a family. And they 
were afraid. It was the young punks like me who 
had nothing to lose. So it was people like me that 
really fought to establish the union. 112 
calecci continues describing his position at Inland and his 
involvement with the swoc and later the Steelworkers Union: 
Of course I was one of the early members of the 
steelworkers Organizing Committee. Then I began to 
be a representative of the department because we had 
to have some representation in the different 
departments throughout the plant. So that if a 
worker had a problem they had some person to go to 
that represented the Union. 
I started working for the company, believe it or not 
as a gandy dancer. A track laborer. I had worked 
during the Depression on the railroad sometimes just 
during the winters. So when I got a job at Inland, 
I began to - oh, they put me in the transportation 
department which included track laborers. I was one 
of the few non-Hispanic speaking persons. Most of 
the people, I would say 95 percent or 98 percent of 
the workers, were Hispanic speaking people. Mexican 
mainly. 
And then from there it took me two years to be able 
to get transferred to one of the rolling mills and 
I suspected I was what we commonly call "black 
balled". One of the reasons was that I had been 
active in the Union. In fact I went further than 
that. Working as a track laborer I worked on a 
special shift. They had a gang that was established 
111Pete Calecci, Interview on August 2, 1989, East 
Chicago, IN. 
for the purpose of maintaining certain lead flux 
into specific departments. In the middle shifts, 
we used to work from 10 in the morning until 6 in 
the evening. Which normally would be an 8-4 (8:00 
A.M. to 4:00 P.M.] system. But we worked 10 to 6 
(10:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.] so that we would be 
available in some of the extra hours to keep certain 
things in working order. 
So this particular department that I was transferred 
into the forty inch mill from the 
transportation department. So this is how I wound 
up in the rolling mills. I stayed there until I 
progressed through the union. Became President for 
two consecutive terms. I held a lot of different 
positions. Was on the grievance committee until I 
left to become President of the local union and 
following that I resigned my last term as President 
in order to get on the staff of the international 
union-- the regular staff of the Steelworkers Union. 
When I retired I was -- I had a position of Sub-
District Director. And I have been retired now 
since 1978 . 113 
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In 1937 the Little Steel companies, of which Inland was 
one, were still fighting against recognizing the union. One 
of the most violent strikes took place at Republic Steel's 
South Chicago mill. It became known as the Memorial Day 
Massacre . 114 Strikes occurred at other steel companies. 
Calecci recalls his involvement: 
Ah, yes. Inland used to pay on the tenth and 
twenty-fifth of each month. That day was May 25. 
We got our checks during lunch hour and I had my 
check with me and the general foreman of the track 
laborers was talking to each guy individually. And 
I kind of suspected what he was talking about, 
because everybody suspected us to strike to seek 
recognition. That is all we were going to seek, was 
recognition as a bargaining agent - On Memorial Day. 
113Pete Calecci, Interview on August 2, 1989, East 
Chicago, IN. 
114Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (San Francisco: Straight Arrow 
Books, 1972), 215. 
And this was the 25th. So uh, when they got to me, 
the proposition was that we would like to use the 
workers during the strike. In other words, you 
would be inside the plant and not go in and out 
during the strike. And rather than get involved 
and into an argument with them I said "I got my 
check today, I got some bills to pay. I live in 
Chicago Heights. Why don't I leave here early. If 
I can make it I'll be back. Meanwhile, this will 
give me a chance to pay some of my bills." So, I 
got home real early. My mother and father were 
saying "What are you doing home early?" And I 
jokingly said to my father, "Well, I'm going to work 
during the strike." He says "What!" I had no 
intentions of really going back anyway. 
So anyway I did not go back. Those that did stay 
now if you can visualize what $4 [$400] and $500 
meant to a worker in those days. [The individuals 
which worked during the strike] Earned as much as 
$4 [$400] or $500 during the period of time that 
they were going to strike inside the plant. Because 
they were at the company's disposal and they were 
not just getting paid for eight hours, they were 
getting paid for additional hours. They knew about 
this [my not working during the strike] and figured 
"uh oh, I'm blackballed" because generally that's 
what they did to those that supported the union. 
But I didn't care, I wasn't going to go back to 
work. 
U.S. Steel finally did agree to allow the s.w.o.c. 
to be the bargaining agent of the worker, and signed 
a contract with the United Steelworkers Committee 
in 1937 and we didn't get a contract from Inland 
until almost 1942 - almost five years. 
If you can imagine, the first contract that Inland 
signed with the Steelworkers was a three page 
document - triple spaced. And now ... 115 
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Inland made no attempt to continue production, hence 
there were few confrontations between the company and workers. 
The strike lasted thirty-four days and ended with an agreement 
115Pete Calecci, Interview on August 2, 1989, East 
Chicago, IN. 
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signed by the governor of Indiana and the swoc, and not 
directly between the company and the union. In a letter to 
Governor Townsend of Indiana, the company agreed to the 
following: (1) to recognize the SWOC as the exclusive 
bargaining agent; (2) to reinstate those who had taken part 
in the strike; ( 3) to model their wages, hours, grievance 
procedure and overtime rates, after those in the U.S. Steel 
Agreement. 116 
The company refused to sign a written contract and 
proceeded to take a hard-line approach. The issue went before 
the National Labor Relations Board which ruled for the SWOC. 117 
' 
The Board ordered that if bargaining resulted in agreement, 
it should be put in the form of a signed contract. Inland 
appealed and this continued for several more years before the 
issue was resolved in favor of the union. 
New Management in Charge 
In 1939 Inland came under new management, but it would 
take some time before any type .of progress to occur. The 
years before World War II were years filled with management's 
116Robert R.R. Brooks, As steel Goes, ... Unionism In A 
Basic Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 144. 
117In re Inland Steel Company and Steelworkers Organizing 
Committee and Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin 
Workers of North America, Lodge Nos. 64, 1010 and 1101·, 3 LRRM 
331 (1938), Inland Steel Company v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 5 LRRM 821 (7th Cir. 1940). 
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attempts to turn the situation around and create a more stable 
condition. 111 Between 1939-1944 management turnover was 
extremely high. The Chicago plant had six managers during 
this time period, with foremen turning over even more, and in 
one two year stretch, the plant had ten personnel managers. 119 
The times were chaotic and they left their mark on both 
management and employees. But eventually an .understanding and 
working relationship developed between all concerned. 
Inland steel and Application of Kochan's Model 
In analyzing Inland's situation during this time period 
one can see it was responding'to the environment. During the 
times of depression and times of war it reacted by increasing 
or decreasing its labor force and production. The initial 
integration of the company's workforce was the result of the 
labor shortages which were experienced during World War I. 
In the past, European immigrants had filled the unskilled 
positions. Initially, they had been paid the lowest wages and 
worked the most undesirable jobs. Over the years, these 
individuals assimilated into society and eventually moved up 
the employment ladder. The issue of race relation policies 
and the integration of the workforce became more consequential 
in the late 1800 's. Providing equal job and promotional 
opportunities for minorities remains a major concern. 
11'Whyte, fattern for Industrial Peace, 18-65. 
119Ibid. , 18. 
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Inland also went through periods of welfare capitalism, 
again adjusting to the environment. This would also be 
considered a smart business strategy because the purpose of 
welfare capitalism120 was to keep individuals working by 
developing programs and improving work conditions, thereby 
making it more difficult for unionization. Keeping people 
working to continue production and increase profits are 
universal and remain constant over time. During these bouts, 
important issues such as safety and the length of work hours 
were addressed, yet in looking back one can see these changes 
would not have been made unless the company was forced to. 
carrying this through Kochan' s model of building an 
industrial relations system, the external environment is then 
influenced by history, current structures, values and business 
strategies. In a corporation this is where its culture 
evolves. Organizations can be categorized into four cultures: 
(1) power culture - which is where the organization is lead 
by a powerful leader who influences all decision making; (2) 
role culture is the characteristic of a conservative 
organization which assigns tasks to specialists; (3) person 
culture - type of organization which exists for the benefit 
of its members, e.g. academic institutions.; (4) task culture 
- which brings the right people and resources together to get 
120John A. Fossum, 
structure. Process 3d ed., 
1985), 32 
Labor Relations: Devel"opment, 
(Plano: Busniess Publications, 
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things done . It uses the team approach whereby everyone 
. b t 121 contri u es. Organizations can operate in more than one 
culture, but there will always be one which is dominant. 
Inland went through periods where it placed no value on 
employees. The company's management was described as being 
a "dictatorship" and "probably one of the most ruthless 
managements ever to perform upon the American scene. 11122 These 
are characteristics of a power culture. The events which 
transpired at Inland are not unique, but had they been 
different, the evolution of the industrial relations system 
might not have evolved amidst such conflict. 
If an industrial relations system is to be successful, 
then the organization needs to not only adjust to its 
environment, but if necessary, begin to change its internal 
structure and values, in order to bring about change. History 
is there so that we can learn from it, find out what went 
right, or wrong, so that alternatives can be identified. 
Deficiencies need to be addressed, and in some instances it 
will take new management to facilitate these changes. Many 
of Inland's problems were due to its old management style, but 
this would change with the new administration. 123 
121Graham Saunders, The Committed Organization (Great 
Britain: Gower Publishing Co., 1984), 9-11. 
122Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, 157. 
123For more information regarding corporate culture see 
for example, Daniel R. Denison, Corporate Culture and 
Organizational Effectiveness (New York: Wiley, 1990). 
CHAPTER 4 
POSTWAR STEEL INDUSTRY 
Government Intervention 1945-1969 
By 1945 the war Labor Board was created, the Little Steel 
Formula implemented and Executive Order 8802 established the 
Federal Employment Policy Commission (FEPC). 1~• Steel prices 
held almost constant during World War II, were frozen and new 
< 
wages decontrolled after World War II. Wage disputes between 
the United Steelworkers Union and steel industry began again 
and subsequently wage negotiations followed every year. Along 
with these wage negotiations, the industry experienced strikes 
every year between 1946-1952. On March 31, 1945, in 
anticipation of future deadlocks, the War Labor Board also 
established the Steel Commission. The Commission was 
empowered to resolve disputes. 
Post World War II also brought industry-wide bargaining. 
Initially, U.S. steel was doing its own bargaining, but it was 
soon joined by other steel companies. The USWA became firmly 
established in the steel industry. The union's demand of the 
iu3 C.F.R. 957 (1941). 
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elimination of geographic wage differentials which first began 
to appear in the 1930s contract negotiations would be an issue 
in every contract negotiation until 1956 . 125 It was not until 
1953 that some companies with geographic wage differentials 
would finally agree to decrease or eliminate them.m 
The War Labor Board, offset their controlling wage 
increases by permitting the expansion of employee benefits. 
The master contract, opened in 1947, included benefit items 
for the first time. A review of contracts for the years 1947 
through 1959 are as follows: 
1. general wage increases 
2. reduction in the geographic wage differentials 
3. guaranteed annual wage increases 
4. changes in the seniority system 
5. social insurance program 
6. union shop 
7. changes in grievance procedure 
8. protection against modification of local plant work 
rule agreements. 121 
125For a discussion on wage negotiations between 1937-1959 
see Robert E. Livernash, Collective Bargaining In The Basic 
steel Industry: A study of the Public Interest and the Role 
of Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Labor 1961), 
237-307; and for a discussion of negotiations between 1946-
1959 see William T. Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and 
steel Industry in the United states. Volume 4: Part VI, 
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1971), 1611-1637. 
126Ibid., 286. 
1210ther items for negotiations would be: changes in 
overtime computation; improved reporting allowance; severance 
pay; improvement in vacation and premium rates for work on 
holidays; changes in job scheduling and safety provisions; 
time and one-half for Saturday work and double time for Sunday 
work. Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel 
Industry, 254. 
63 
The environment continues to change. The steel industry 
began to expand again in the 1950's during the Korean War. 
steel production in the United States increased from ninety-
seven million tons in 1950, to 112 million tons in 1953 . 129 
Presidential action during the war, seized the steel mills . 129 
This was the first and only time it has occurred. The Supreme 
court later found the seizure to be unconstitutional, 130 but 
this action disrupted the collective bargaining process. 
Along with government intervention, another factor 
influenced the environment, technical advancement in steel 
production. Between 1950 and 1960 the steel industry 
increased its capacity almost fifty percent, from 99.4 to 
148. 6 million tons. 131 This effected collective bargaining. 
The first steps toward industry-wide bargaining began in 
1955 when the union announced David J. McDonald would chair 
each of the union's negotiating committees, to lend uniformity 
to the contracts. In 1956 major steel companies formed the 
Steel Coordinating Committee: Allegheny-Ludlum Steel; 
Bethlehem Steel; Inland Steel; Jones and Laughlin Steel; 
128Eldon S. Hendriksen, Capital Expenditures in the Steel 
Industry. 1900-1953 (New York: Arno Co., 1978), 69. 
129John L. Blackman, Jr., Presidential Seizure in Labor 
Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 73 
130The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, et al., 
Petitioners v. Charles Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579-710 (1952). 
131Phi 1 i p W. Nyden, 
Political Economy of a 
Praeger, 1984), 34. 
Steelworkers Rank-And-File: The 
Union Reform Movement (New York: 
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Republic Steel; and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. 132 This 
committee had four representatives which bargained with the 
union on major issues. U.S. Steel had two members, Bethlehem 
steel had one and Republic one. Industry-wide bargaining was 
now in place. In 1959 these same representatives wanted to 
bargain on all contract terms, not just major issues, but the 
union declined, taking the position that they wanted to leave 
the less important issues to the individual bargaining units. 
On July 15, 1959, 500,000 workers went on strike, closing 
doors on eighty-five percent of the nation's steel capacity. 133 
This strike lasted 116 days. It was the longest in history. 
The environment leading to this was marked with high economic 
inflation and over five million people unemployed. 134 The 
unions anticipated that the technological changes in the steel 
industry would lead to layoffs. Industry management was 
concerned about employment costs resulting from the 1956 labor 
agreement, foreign competition and inflation. Both parties 
negotiated for ten weeks without reaching an agreement. On 
132The remaining members of the Steel Coordinating 
Committee were: Armco Steel Corporation; The Colorado Fuel and 
Iron Corporation; Great Lakes Steel Corporation; Kaiser Steel 
Corporation. National Council of the Church of Christ in the 
United States of America, In Search of Maturity in Industrial 
Relations (New York: Office of Publication and Distribution, 
1960), 27. 
133Ibid., 30. 
134Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1959 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959), 204. 
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October 21, 1959 President Eisenhower ended the strike under 
Taft-Hartley135 and on November 7, the Supreme Court upheld the 
injunction. 136 The longest industry-wide strike ended after 
116 days. When the strike was settled, the new collective 
agreement provided for wage and benefit increases, a long-term 
study on work-practices, and the establishment of a Human 
Relations Committee to deal with employee problems. 
status of the Black Worker Post World War II 
At the end of World War II, war industries began cutting 
back in production. In the steel industry the blacks were 
the first ones to lose their jobs. The FEPC began to lose its 
importance and by 1946 it was dissolved. Even though the FEPC 
had no direct enforcement power, it provided the black worker 
the opportunity 1 i tigate against employers and unions. It 
would be another two decades before legislation against 
employment discrimination would be enacted. 
Unions had their share of problems in integrating their 
members. Blacks began, after World War II, to try to 
eliminate racially segregated seniority rosters. 137 These were 
13561 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 u.s.c. § 206 
(1982). 
136United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 
U.S. 39 (1959). 
u
1See for example, Local 53 Heat & Frost Insulators v. 
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1959); Whitfield v. United 
Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546, 551 (5th Cir.) ~. denied 360 
U.S. 902 (1959); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, 279 F.Supp 505 
(E.D. Va. 1968); U.S. v. Sheetmetal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 
123 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 189, United Paperworkers v. U.S., 
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supported by racially segregated unions including the 
steelworkers Union . 138 
At the end of World War II, the AFL had established a 
record of accepting segregated unions. At the 1946 AFL 
convention, a resolution endorsing Federal Fair Employment 
Practices legislation passed only after "and labor unions" was 
deleted from a motion calling for the end of race, color, 
religion, and national origin discrimination in industry and 
labor unions. 
The CIO's efforts on the other hand, showed more 
commitment in fighting racism. Their success in organizing 
the black workers and did more to eliminate racial barriers 
by bringing them into the realm of union membership. Better 
wages, benefits and job security were needed economic 
improvements for the black worker. The CIO also made the 
issue of union racial policies highly visible. Their first 
attempt in persuading President Roosevelt to adopt the FEPC 
proved to be unsuccessful. Yet once the FEPC was created, the 
CIO proved to be one of its strongest supporters. 139 When the 
two unions merged the AFL-CIO in 1955, the new federation 
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. denied 397 U.S. 919 (1970). 
138The issue of segregated seniority rosters was most 
prominent in the following unions: Oil Workers; Pulp, Sulphite 
and Paper Mill Worker; Paperworkers; Rubber Workers. Julius 
Jacobson, ed. , The Negro and the American Labor Movement 
(Gaulen City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1968), 150. 
139Ibid. I 208. 
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signed a Merger Agreement statement saying that the new 
federation 
Shall constitutionally recognize the rights of all 
workers without regard to race, creed, or national 
origin to share in the full benefits of trade union 
organizations in the merged federation. The merged 
federation shall establish appropriate internal 
machinery to bring about, at the earliest possible 
date, the effective implementation of this principle 
of non-discrimination."0 
After the merger the new federations commitment to civil 
rights was unknown. Michael J. Quill, a CIO vice-president 
and president of the Transport Workers Union criticized the 
statement as "weak and vague. 11141 Until the time of the merger 
the AFL had openly condemned disciplinary policies and 
practices for some of its affiliates but had not taken any 
action against them for discrimination. The CIO, with a 
Committee for Civil Rights failed to take any action against 
employers practicing discrimination. An inconsistency between 
published statements and practice continued. 
Unions perpetuated employment segregation by maintaining 
segregated seniority rosters and restricting blacks to certain 
menial jobs. 142 An example of this inequality was the 
situation with the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). In 
1957 the Homestead, Pennsylvania local of the USWA, received 
"°Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 312. 
141Philip Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers 
to the Merger (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 312. 
142See, for example, Lamont E. Stallworth, "The 
Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances," 253-267. 
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a complaint that black members were discriminated against in 
the local. The union had a policy of keeping black workers 
in the three lowest of the thirty-two wage classification. 
In the same year, a group of black steelworkers in 
Pittsburgh, formed an organization called the Fair Share Group 
of Steel Workers. As union members they wanted their "fair 
share of jobs and benefits." The organization wrote to David 
McDonald, President of the USWA and George Meany, complaining 
about treatment of blacks throughout the industry and asked 
for action. Other locals with black members began 
establishing similar groups. At the same time black auto 
workers were beginning to discuss similar grievances to their 
union through the Trade Union Leadership Council. These 
activities did not receive much attention outside the unions, 
but they did gain the attention of the NAACP. The NAACP 
continued their fight for equality in the unions. In 1961 
the NAACP published a report on the first five years of the 
AFL-CIO, concluding that apart from some changes they had not 
accomplished as much as people had been led to believe. 
. . . the national labor organization has failed to 
eliminate the broad pattern of racial discrimination 
and segregation in many important affiliated unions 
• . • Efforts to eliminate discriminatory practices 
within trade unions have been piecemeal and 
inadequate and usually the result of protest by 
civil rights agencies acting on behalf of negro 
workers. The national AFL-CIO has repeatedly 
refused to take action on its own initiative . . . 
Discriminatory racial practices by trade unions are 
not simply isolated or occasional expressions of 
local bias against colored workers, but rather as 
the record indicates, a continuation of the 
institutionalized pattern of anti-negro employment 
practices that is traditional with large sections 
of organized labor and individual management •143 
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In 1962, Local 2401 of the USWA was charged by the NAACP 
with establishing separate job classification and wage scales 
for black and white workers doing the same work and providing 
in the collective bargaining agreement for separate lines of 
promotion and confining blacks to unskilled low paying jobs. 
Charges such as this continued to be filed.iu 
steel Industry Consent Decree 
In 1974 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and 
the Secretary of Labor filed a suit against nine major steel 
t 
companies and the USWA alleging race, sex and national origin 
discrimination in hiring and job assignments. 145 The legal 
document charged that minorities and women were restricted to 
the lowest paying jobs with no room for advancement. The USWA 
143Herbert Hill, "Racism Within Organized Labor," Journal 
of Negro Education, 30 Spring 1961, 109-118. 
"'For a discussion of occupational segregation see, for 
example, Francine D. Blau, The Economics of Women. Men and 
~ (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1986); Herbert R. 
Northrup and Richard L. Rowan, The Negro and Employment 
Opportunities: Problems and Practices (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan, 1965), ,4-64; Herbert R. Northrup, Negro 
Employment in Basic Industry; A Study of Racial Policies in 
Six Industries. Volume I. Studies of Negro Employment 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1970), 11-38. 
145The companies are: Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 
Armco Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Jones 
and Laughlin Steel Corporation, National steel Corporation, 
Republic Steel Corporation, United States Steel Corporation, 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube company. 
70 
was included for formulating a discriminatory collective 
bargaining agreement which established a seniority system for 
promotions, layoffs, recall and transfer, which adversely 
effected minorities and women. 
The suit involved approximately 240-250 plants and more 
than 300,000 employees. The final outcome was the signing of 
two consent decrees. Consent Decree I covered issues which 
fell under collective bargaining and called for substantive 
relief in the following areas: 
1. Implementation of broad plantwide seniority, 
along with transfers and testing reforms, and 
adoption of ongoing mechanisms to reform 
seniority, departmental, and line of 
progression structures, which were to be 
designed to correct past discriminatory 
assignments.; 
2. Establishment of goals and timetables to 
increase utilization of minorities and women 
in occupations and job categories from which 
they were excluded from the past; 
3. Establishment of a back pay fund of $30, 940, 000 
to be paid to the minorities and women which 
were discriminated against . 146 
Consent Decree II dealt with employment issues which were 
controlled by the company and not subject to collective 
bargaining. It required the companies to initiate 
affirmative action programs in hiring, promotion, management 
training, initial assignments and recruitment of minorities 
146Uni ted States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, :inc., et 
al., C.A. Ala. 1975, 517 F. 2d 826, ~- denied 96 s. ct. 
1684, 425 U.S. 944, 48 L.Ed.2d 187. 
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and women • 147 
The Consent Decree addressed the unlawful discriminatory 
employment practices engaged by the USWA and the steel 
companies. such practices negatively effected the 
integration of black workers into the workforce. Limited job 
and promotional opportunities and exclusion from training 
programs, prevented blacks from reaching . parity with the 
white workers. 
Inland Steel was one of the major steel companies 
included in this suit. When the suit was originally filed 
Inland analyzed their workforce and personnel policies. They 
t 
discovered their workforce was evenly distributed in most of 
the job classifications identified by the EEOC. In addition, 
their human resources policies and programs were fairly 
applied. The human resources personnel department presented 
Inland' s case to the president and recommended that the 
company not sign the Consent Decree. After thoroughly 
examining the information presented to him, he agreed. 
Early EEO Public Policy 
Franklin Roosevelt created the first Fair Employment 
Practice Committee (FEPC) in 1941. The FEPC had the power to 
147Ibid. See, for example, Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 
424 (1970); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193 (1979); LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 95 Cal. App. 
3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979) ~. dismissed for want of 
finality, 452 u.s. 105, 101 s.ct. 2211, 68 L.Ed. 2d 706 
(1981). 
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investigate complaints of discrimination in the defense 
industries. This first FEPC was overpowered by southern 
politicians, railroad unions and employers. A second FEPC 
was created with a new Executive Order in 1943, this time 
placing it under the Office of Emergency Management, but it 
too proved to be ineffective. 
In 1953 President Eisenhower established the Presidents 
Committee on Government Contracts (PCGC). The Committee's 
goal was to establish equal employment opportunity for people 
employed or seeking employment, in agencies covered by 
government contracts. One way the Committee sought to 
achieve this objective was by making it the responsibility of 
the head of each federal government agency to obtain 
compliance with the nondiscrimination clause in any contract 
or subcontract entered into by that agency. Because unions 
did not have government contracts , the Committee took the 
position that it did not have any jurisdiction over labor 
organizations. This was hard to ignore because many aspects 
of employment were influenced by unions. The PCGC did a 
study and found that between 1953-1956 unions were directly 
or indirectly involved in over twenty percent of the cases 
received by the Committee. 148 In addition the study discovered 
the following: 
1. All complaints, except one which alleged 
discrimination against Spanish-Americans, by 
148Ray Marshall, The Negro And Organized Labor (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1965), 221. 
a railroad and railway brotherhood, were for 
discrimination against blacks. 
2. Charges included denial of membership to 
blacks, thereby forcing companies to discharge 
them. 
3. Refusal by a company to hire a black because 
he could not get into a union. 
4. Restricting blacks to certain departments and 
excluding them from apprenticeship training 
programs. 
5. Violation of seniority rights. 
6. Providing in the contract for separate lines 
of progression for blacks and whites. 
7. Failure of a union to protest seniority 
violations. 
8. Refusal to file charges against the company for 
failing to promote or hire blacks in categories 
other than labor janitors. 149 
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Despite its findings, the PCGC had relatively no impact 
on the unions. Their power was limited. Lack of federal 
funding an inefficient enforcement structure produced very 
few results. 
In 1961 President Kennedy appointed a Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity (PCEEO) giving it power to require 
contractors to submit compliance reports which gave 
information concerning the racial practices of the unions 
with which they were dealing. The PCEEO now also had the 
authority to request that contractors: 
Provide statements in writing from a labor union 
together with supporting information, to the effect 
that it said labor union's • • practices and 
polices do not discriminate on the grounds of race, 
color, creed, or national origin, and that the labor 
union or representative will affirmatively 
cooperate, within the limits of his legal and 
contractual authority, in the implementation of the 
policy and provisions of this order, or that it 
consents and agrees that recruitment, employment, 
149.Ib..i_g • 
and the terms and conditions of employment under 
the proposed contract shall be in accordance with 
the purpose and provisions of this order. 150 
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The PCEEO adopted a program to have unions as well as 
contractors sign a "Plans for Progress" which was designed to 
open employment and promotion opportunities to blacks. In 
June, 1964 eleven steel companies entered into a Plans for 
Progress: Armco, Bethlehem, Great Lakes Steel, Inland, 
Colorado Fuel and Iron, Jones and Laughlin, Pittsburgh, 
Republic, United States Steel, Wheeling, Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube. 151 That same month these same companies entered into a 
nondiscrimination agreement with the USWA. 
The policy statements of the companies generally read as 
follows: 
It is the policy of the Corporation to seek and 
employ the best qualified personnel in all its 
facilities and at all of its working locations; to 
provide equal opportunities for the advancement of 
employees including upgrading, promotion, and 
training; and to conduct these activities in a 
manner which will not discriminate against any 
person because of race, color, creed, or national 
origin. 154 
Along with such a statement the plans included dissemination 
of the policy, identifying who was going to be responsible for 
implementation, recruitment, training and placement. 
"Plans for Progress" was voluntary and imposed no 
lSOibid • I 226 • 
151Northrup, Negro Employment in Basic Industry, 320. 
mibid., 321, as cited in U.S. Steel News, July, 1964. 
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sanctions. It was not until the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 153 and particularly Title VII, m that a legal 
system would be in place to protect individuals from 
discrimination and provide the power to enforce~5 and obtain 
others to comply with the law. The Civil Rights Act 
prohibited discrimination in education, voting and employment. 
Title VII, which deals with equal employment opportunity 
states that labor unions are not: 
1. To exclude or to expel from its membership or 
otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual because of race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin. 
2. To limit, segregate, or classify its membership 
or to classify or fail to refuse for 
employment any individual , in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities, or would limit 
such employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his/her status as an employee 
or as an applicant for employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 
3. To cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an individual in violation 
of this section.~6 
~342 u.s.c. § 2oooe, et seg. 
~·§ 703(a)(l) of Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
155See 1972 Amendments to Title VII regarding the EEOC's 
enforcement powers. 
1~civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, sec. 703(c), 42 
USC§ 2000e-2(c). 
76 
The evolution of public policy to eradicate 
discrimination has gone from "window-dressing" to actually 
enforcing compliance, by both businesses and unions. Despite 
the National Labor Relations Act, Civil Rights Act, Title VII 
and Executive Order 11246, discrimination still exists. Of 
the nine steel companies involved in the 1974 steel Consent 
Decree, Armco Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, Republic Steel 
Corporation, United States Steel Corporation, Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and Tube, 
were part of the eleven companies which had entered into a 
"Plans for Progress," and signed a nondiscrimination 
agreement with the USWA in 1964. 
Today there is recourse for those who believe that they 
have been discriminated against in employment. With the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and particularly 
Title VII, disenfranchised individuals have a formal recourse 
to redress their rights. 157 The enactment of Title VII and the 
Supreme Courts decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 158 
combined with a courageous federal court system, created a 
new employment environment. 
As in Kochan's model, the external climate created this 
157See Michele M. Hoyman and Lamont E. Stallworth, "Who 
Files suit and Why: An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious 
Worker," University of Illinois Law Review ( 1981): 11·5-159. 
m347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
new employment environment. 
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These laws resulted in 
businesses changing their industrial relations systems. In 
turn, new employment policies, hiring and promotion 
practices, also led to modifications in union contracts. The 
steel industry, unions and the government are the three 
parties which Kochan identified as needing to be present in 
an industrial relations system. The external environment 
proved to be the catalyst in creating more progressive labor-
management relations. 
CHAPTER 5 
INLAND STEEL POST WORLD WAR II 
workforce 
During the period of time between 1945 and 1974 the steel 
companies experienced a more powerful United steelworkers 
Union, the establishment of the Steel Commission and greater 
numbers of blacks in the workforce. Also during this period, 
Inland Steel was also subject to environmental factors such 
as Title VII. Similar to other steel companies, Inland had 
a more diverse workforce which was required to successfully 
integrate. 
The demand for labor in the steel industry increased in 
1941 due to the onset of World War II. As experienced during 
World War I, the methods of hiring and training were similar. 
Frank Cassel, retired Director of Industrial Relations 
recollects: 
The great stories, none of which I can confirm, but 
which I think are fairly true is that the method of 
hiring in the Depression was to take one of six guys 
and you would throw six half dollars into the crowd 
and the six guys who came out with the half dollars 
were hired. And when you hired a roller or melter, 
in those days you hired the roller and he brought 
his own crew and you paid him and his own crew, he's 
an entrepreneur. 
78 
The employment office didn't begin to grow until 
World War II. World War II created the real 
personnel function, because what it did, it required 
manning tables from every company. And you had to 
tell the government of who the people were on your 
payroll; and who was going to replace them when they 
were drafted for the war; and what provisions you 
had made; and you had to have a plan that was 
approved by the Federal Manpower Agency in the war 
so that the company wouldn't shut down if you 
drafted people; and so you had to have key people. 
And that really started the companies in some kind 
of personnel planning. It was the war that 
started. 159 
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Minority Workforce 
Cassel shares his beliefs as to why Inland experienced 
a labor shortage when World W~r II began: 
Yes, during World War II there was a similar influx 
of workers as there had been in World War I. We had 
more women and Mexicans working in the mills again. 
World war II was the period in which women made the 
greatest gains in the mills. By that time the 
military was drafting blacks and Mexicans. The 
reason they weren't drafting them in World War I is 
that they couldn't pass the Army intelligence test. 
The army intelligence test is a pencil and paper 
test. And most of the blacks and Mexicans were 
illiterate . 160 
Cassel mentioned that Mexicans were "imported" from the 
American side of the border. In his conversation he continues 
to provide a profile of Inland's Hispanic workforce during 
World War II: 
IL. 
IL. 
They came here as illegals, and nobody ever did 
anything about them. In fact, if you look at East 
Chicago, Indiana very, very closely, you' 11 find 
159Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
16°Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
three layers of Mexicans. You' 11 find the real 
original layer, that came and worked, and that are 
now the supervisors and managers, in the mills --
now not all of them, but some of them are. It took 
them all of those years up till the present to get 
this far. 
Another layer that came from Mexico in World War 
II.~1 But there is a third layer [of Hispanics], 
who came from New York. And they came to Inland 
from Puerto Rico, via New York. They couldn't find 
work in New York. 162 
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Bill Dillon, retired Vice-President of Industrial 
Relations agrees with Cassel's analysis of the Hispanic 
workforce. Dillon shares his thoughts regarding the hiring 
of minorities in Inland Steel: 
In the war years, they had a lot of Mexican 
[Hispanic] people coming in - Puerto Rican people. 
The Mexicans stayed, the Puerto Ricans never really 
adjusted particularly to that environment. But our 
numbers were always something like 60-20-20. 60% 
White, 20% Black, 20% Hispanic. And we now have 
third and fourth, and fifth generation of mostly 
the Mexican background people. Mostly the Mexicans 
stayed, the Puerto Ricans, this is before I got 
there, but I'm told that they brought them in during 
the war, but they never really adjusted to that 
environment. They were there, they made a few 
bucks and then they took off. The Mexican-
Americans, they really made a very solid foundation 
in terms of a community there in East Chicago and 
161For a discussion of Mexican labor in the United States 
during this era see e.g. Manuel P. Servin, An Awakening 
Minority: The Mexican-Ainericans (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 
1974); George C. Kiser and Martha Woody Kiser, Mexican Workers 
in the United States (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 19 7 9) ; Richard Craig, The Bracero Program (Austin: 
University of Texas, 1971). 
mFrank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
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have been very successful . 163 
Inland also had a multi-culturally diverse workforce, 
some which came from Western Europe. Cassel describes one of 
their employees: 
In fact, in World War II, Inland got a substantial 
number of refugees from Western Europe. Refugees 
from Germany. Who had Ph.D.'s and were doctors, 
and couldn't get hired in American academic 
institutions or could not practice medicine, who 
became part of the Inland Steel chemistry 
department. In fact one of the Union leaders during 
that time, was a man by the name of Frank Kretz, who 
was an Austrian. Kretz, had a Ph.D. in chemistry 
and he was also a doctor, an M.D. He couldn't get 
a license to practice in this country. And he and 
his family fled Germany and gone to Argentina and 
from Argentina to the United States. And ended up 
in our chemistry department. And then became an 
active official of the Steelworkers Union. 164 
Women in the Workforce 
Due to the labor shortage created during the war, women 
were brought into the workforce. Pete Calecci comments on 
their role at Inland during World War II: 
IL. 
IL. 
As you can imagine, when men were drafted into the 
armed services, for World War II a lot of women 
began to get hired. As the men came back they began 
to lay off women on the basis on whomever they 
replaced. This was not proper, because you do this 
on the basis of service . 1 ' 5 
Women were hired into nontraditional jobs. The state 
163Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
164Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
165Pete Calecci, Interview on August 2, 1989, East 
Chicago, IN. 
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laws which had previously prevented them from working such 
jobs were relaxed during the war . 166 Dillon reiterates women's 
roles: 
The role of women is funny in the steel industry. 
During the war - World War II - they brought women 
into the steel industry. They did just about every 
job - running crane . . . They did almost every job 
in the steel industry. 167 Well, the day the war 
ended the women were just pushed out. All of a 
sudden there were no women. The war is over now. 
We don't need you. Basically that is what happened. 
As soon as the guys got back - the women were out. 
It wasn't until these later years - when the civil 
Rights movement started up - you started getting 
more women . 168 
Work Stoppages and Issues 
After World War II the War Labor Board removed their wage 
controls. Between 1946-1959, Inland experienced twelve work 
stoppages. The sources of these conflicts would be due to wage 
disputes and social insurance programs. There was one major 
change in these strikes from those of previous years, and this 
was that the relationship between industry and the union had 
evolved from being adversarial to being more cooperative. 
Bill Dillon recalls: 
1946-1950's there were strikes every two years and 
that is when coordinated bargaining came into 
166Stall Worth I 
Grievances," 106. 
"The Arbitration of Discrimination 
167See, for example, Jean T. McKelvey, "Sex and the Single 
Arbitrator," Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting 
of the National Academy of Arbitrators (Washington, D.C.: 
Bureau of National Affairs, 1971). 
161Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
IL. 
being. 169 That is when the industry and the union 
got together and said "Why don't we try and do this 
on an industry wide basis." And that is where the 
coordinated bargaining came in 1956 - I think. 1 ' 0 
When we decided we would bargain on a coordinated 
basis . 171 
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The steel industry would use coordinated bargaining 
during contract negotiations with the USWA. When asked if 
any policies that evolved out of these strikes Dillon 
responded: 
The only thing that evolved out of the strikes was 
the idea that there had to be a better way to do it 
rather than by individual companies. So that we'll 
do it as a coordinated group. And of course, the 
companies wanted that to some degree because you 
could make a settlement with, for example, U.S. 
Steel and Bethlehem. 
And now here is Inland, and you came to Inland on 
these local issues. We want more money or you're 
gonna be on strike and that put a burden on Inland, 
1690ne of the goals of the Steelworkers union was to 
institute coordinated bargaining, which in the steel industry 
became industrywide bargaining. The Steelworkers union 
attempts to institute coordinated bargaining proved 
unsuccessful until 1956. Prior to this the union was unable 
to overcome industry opposition. Because U.S. Steel was the 
largest company, they would sign the initial contract and the 
remaining steel companies followed suit. By 1956, the 
environment had significantly changed. At this time, the 
major steel companies had their representatives bargain with 
the union on major issues. The ultimate agreement would be 
with all of the companies represented. The bargaining of the 
lesser issues would be left to the individual companies and 
the local unions. Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American 
Steel: How Management. Labor. and Government Went Wrong (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 150. 
~see, for example, National Council of the Church of 
Christ, In Search of Maturity in Industrial Relations, 27; 
Livernash, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry, 
297. 
171Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
IL. 
IL. 
because we were a one plant company. Now see at 
U.S. Steel and Bethlehem they had plants all over 
the country and they could have strikes on local 
issues in Birmingham and nothing in Pittsburgh. But 
Inland, when we had a strike we were out of 
business. So we were really at risk all of those 
times. It just so happened that there were strikes 
going on all over the country. 
But in those days there was a philosophy - an 
economic philosophy - that steel strikes hurt the 
economy of the U.S. Everybody believed it. And 
that is when they started to say, o.k. lets do it 
a different way, lets have a coordinated bargaining 
and that's where you ended up with the largest 
companies, U.S. Steel, Republic, and Bethlehem, 
sitting at the top across the table from the Abels 
and McDonalds, to negotiate the contract. 
And after that you've got the coordinating 
committee. In theory this is where we were - the 
Bill Caples - and while they were meeting with the 
union so were we, and they would come back and tell 
us what the union said. We had sub-committees too, 
for example benefits and seniority. They'd come 
back and in theory discuss what they were going to 
do and give you some input, but minimal. This is 
why Inland with the one plant was better off in that 
system, because if there was a strike, it was a 
national strike and everybody was out, not just us. 
So that we benef i tted to that extent and then 
usually after you had a national strike you had a 
settlement so that was the benefit to us in going 
along with this, although we did lose some of our 
economy in negotiating. You had not only the 
economics, but you also had the basic - other basic 
contract issues like contracting out and incentives 
and those were what we called top table items. 
You had input, but it was not perfect by a long 
shot. The companies that were not sitting at the 
top table, were really not satisfied but it was more 
"What else can you do. They are going to do what 
they want, they are going to make the deal and when 
they want to make it, its going to be made. 11112 
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The steel companies began coordinated bargaining, or 
112Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
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industrywide bargaining, in 1956. During this period the 
issue of nondiscrimination clauses in the labor contracts was 
not addressed. Individual companies, such as Inland Steel, 
would take the lead and include such clauses in their 
contracts prior to 1964. 
Race Relations 
Race relation problems continued to exist both during and 
after World War II. Cassel shared his views concerning the 
manner in which minorities were treated in the work 
environment: 
There was a book publ.lshed about 1958, by the 
University of Chicago Press. 173 The guy that did the 
research did it in the '50's. So what I'm telling 
you about the race relationship in the 50's, will 
give you some idea of what it might have been like 
in World War II. Because you may recall that World 
War II had come, Harry Truman had ordered that an 
on all government contracts, this was an Executive 
Order, you could not discriminate against people. 
This was well before the Civil Rights Act of the 
1960's. 
These are interviews taken around 1954. Negroes and 
Mexicans comprised about a third of the production 
force in the mill. None of the Negroes and only 
one of the Mexicans believed they could ever become 
a foreman. Negroes asserted that they don't promote 
colored, whereas Mexicans usually described their 
lack of opportunity due to poor education and their 
lack of command of the English language. 
What is interesting, in light of the present 
is that one of the Negroes, even argued 
discrimination on race, prevented workers 
getting promoted. 
day, 
that 
from 
173Joel Siedman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh and Daisy L. 
Taglia-Cozzo, The Worker Views His Union (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1958). 
Some of the workers of Eastern European birth 
complained that they were discriminated against. 
One said "I'm a hunky, and a hunky has no chance." 
I'll tell you about race relations in the 50's. 
Some of the workers of Eastern European birth 
complained that they were discriminated against. 
And since I worked out there I can tell you fabulous 
stories about the ladder of discrimination by ethnic 
group and by race - with everybody in the mill 
trying to look down on everybody else. 
Until the blacks and Hispanics came along, everybody 
had managed to put the Poles and the Croatians, at 
the bottom of the ladder. But when the Hispanics 
and blacks showed up in numbers, the Poles managed 
to put them in the bottom of the ladder. We had 
many, many, many, racial disputes in the mill 
between ethnics and blacks and Hispanics. And one 
of the problems of that is that it became a 
management problem, because very often the union 
was of no help because there was nothing in the 
contract except to fire them all for fighting. See 
there was no solution to the problem. We had white 
guys, who would go around with ascedline torches 
and stick them in the nose of the locker and burn 
the clothes up of the newcoming workers whether they 
were southern whites, or whether they were blacks, 
or whether they were hispanics. Anybody new coming 
into the mill. 
Now you can say the company won't discriminate, but 
there was nothing in the labor agreement that 
covered it. And very often the union guy was caught 
between his own membership. He was unable to do 
very much. 174 
86 
Calecci, who worked in the mill agreed that the worker, 
not the company, discriminated against the employees. When 
asked if he felt there was any discrimination at work or in 
the union, he responded: 
IL. 
At Inland it was al together different. Let me point 
this out to you. There is no way that I can prove 
174Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4; 1989, Evanston, 
it to you but let's take a company like 
Youngstown. Youngstown hired more blacks than 
Latinos and their reason was I believe that blacks 
knew the English language and could converse with 
them. 
Inland had just the opposite as to what Youngstown 
had. Youngstown had more blacks and Inland had more 
Latinos. 
I think that Inland has been given - and rightly so 
- some credit to embracing the Latinos. But there 
is also this to it and that is that the Latinos 
lived along the area where Inland's plant was so 
they could walk to work. 
So sure there were some problems at first, because 
they didn't understand English. 
Discrimination had a big role in the unions trying 
to get to the worker. "Damn fool they are 
discriminating against you because you're a Latino 
or Black." And they themselves could see this 
discrimination. For example, they could see a 
foreman sneaking around just to see what you were 
doing. 
We in our own ways established Spanish speaking 
committees. Where the committees would met with the 
respective representatives from each department and 
try to determine what mode of discrimination was 
being practiced in that department. 
One of the departments - the blooming mill - there 
were two shifts with bus transportation inside the 
plant from and to the department we worked at. So 
the 8 [p.m.]-4 [a.m.] nights a bus would be waiting 
for these people and take them to wash up, get on 
the bus to take them where they needed to clock out. 
What was happening was that the Latinos would not 
be able to enter the locker room and wash up until 
after the whites were finished. 
All of a sudden there are complaints, because the 
whites had to wait for them to get on the bus. They 
knew damn well the union was watching the situation 
and so they could not tell them they had to be there 
a certain time or the bus would leave them, they had 
to treat everyone the same. So what happens, is 
that the white people tell them to go ahead and 
change clothes, because they did not want to wait 
any longer than they had too. So then the Latinos 
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began to share all of the facilities. It wasn't 
Inland that discriminated - it was the worker. 
At Youngstown - while I don't know so much about it 
because I worked at Inland, they had discrimination 
too and they even had it worse than at Inland 
because the opportunity for promotion were even 
worse at Youngstown. Because unless you were white 
you were not promoted to the next job. 
There were some complaint that arose with the East 
Chicago Human Relations Commission where the 
laborers, practically all Mexican .- this at 
Youngstown - Mexicans that used to help as brick 
mortar laborers - had no chance of promotion - could 
not even become brick layers. 175 
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Calecci believed that between the 1950s and 1960s 
minorities had better opportunities for advancement at Inland 
' than at other steel companies. Despite the fact white 
employees displayed such deplorable behavior towards 
minorities, Calecci knew it was not condoned by management. 
The fact management took action once they became aware of such 
incidences, demonstrated their equitable treatment towards all 
employees. 
Inland had some human resources policies in place, yet 
the environment was such that these policies were considered 
harsh. Cassel recalls some of these earlier policies: 
Oh yes, we had policies that were very strict, we 
fired them. When we found a guy doing something 
like that, we fired them on the spot. Very strict 
with you. We fired quite a few. We caught one guy 
in a crane chasing a guy with a load of steel trying 
to kill him because he didn't like him - it was a 
black guy. The guy would run down one aisle and the 
guy would run his crane over and try to drop the 
load on him. 
175Pete Calecci, Interview on August 2, 1989, East 
Chicago, IN. 
The company had very strict policies, we just fired 
them right on the spot. And very frequently we 
fired both participants. That's where it became 
quite unfair. But we had no way of dealing with 
it. Frequently, we had no witnesses to tell us who 
started the fight. We tried to mediate a dispute, 
where a white guy beat the hell out of some 
southern hillbillies and I ended up firing all of 
them. 
So when you say you have polices, what policies do 
you have? Things were pretty rough in those days. 176 
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If any policy is to be successful it must have top 
management's support. During this era "equal employment" was 
nonexistent, yet Inland was a company which appeared to be 
committed to civil rights. When asked if, and why, Inland's 
upper management wished to eradicate race discrimination, 
Cassel replied: 
Intellectually yes. The very powerful influence in 
the company were the Block family. Joseph, L.E., 
[and] Phillip D. Block. They had - there father 
had - founded the company, and they were German 
Jews, liberals. You have to understand some 
differences between German Jewish, Polish Jewish 
and Russian Jewish, in the immigration. These 
people were liberals, in the sense that they really 
believed in democracy. I believe that they 
believed, that ethnic and racial discrimination was 
wrong . 177 
Sometimes management support is not enough. If first 
line supervisors are equally committed then the integration 
of the workforce would not be successful. Cassel described 
176Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
177Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
how minority employees were sometimes treated: 
We even had discrimination against Jews, as well as 
blacks and Hispanics in the mill. And some of it 
violent. These guys didn't play for fun, they 
played for keeps. In the case of one case we had, 
we had a Jewish kid who was driving a pick-up truck 
because he was picking up stuff and another guy in 
a truck who tried to shove him in front of a train, 
going through the mill. The mill is full of trains. 
We had all these incidents with blacks and with 
Hispanics. So there was that sort o~ thing that 
existed. But what really developed was not the 
attitude of the people as much as the labor 
shortage, that began to develop in the late . 178 
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Minority employees had no legal recourse for this kind 
of treatment. The company may have had policies and 
management's commitment, but 'if first line supervisors were 
not as equally committed, situations such as this would 
continue. With the passing of Title VII, this type of blatant 
discrimination would eventually diminish. 
Company Programs 
Many corporations took a proactive approach in dealing 
with race discrimination, by developing comprehensive minority 
recruitment programs, and training, or loan-management 
programs. 179 In further conversation Cassel spoke of some of 
178Frank Cassel, Interview on August 2, 1989 ~ Evanston, 
IL. 
179For example, companies such as International Harvester 
Company and Western Electric implemented a recruitment program 
with black high schools and colleges. Honeywell, Inc. 
provided summer employment to black faculty so that the 
company could work with the university to prepare a curriculum 
to meet the future demand for people in the technical field. 
Northrup, The Negro and Employment Opportunities, 111-145. 
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the programs Inland instituted: 
They loaned me for six months to the National Anti-
Defamation League to study ethnic and racial 
discrimination, in hotels. It turned out there was 
substantial anti-semitism against hotel owners 
refusal to hire Jews. 
There was a blatant refusal to hire Jews in the 
steel industry. I was in a meeting with some 
executive of Republic Steel and I had some 
colleagues with me and we were discussing a problem 
and we disagreed with the other steel companies, 
and a fellow I knew very well, lost his temper and 
he said, "That's all you can expect from a goddam 
Jew company." He represented Republic Steel. 
But for the Anti-Defamation League, I looked at 
hotels and I looked at steel and Inland was the only 
one who had Jews in high executive offices. One of 
the most remarkable things, but one of the worst 
discriminators of Jews was a hotel chain, by the 
name of Sheine. The Sheine family, was Jewish 
itself. Sheine was one-half of the team of Sheine-
Coehn who aided Senator McCarthy in his hearings. 
Inland people, the support. - I used to make 
speeches in those days that you had to have top-
management support and I still believe that, but it 
was very thin. It was among people like the Blocks. 
I don't think, for instance, it extended to the 
general managers, for the plant, who had more power 
than they did, over people's lives. 180 
The conversation revealed the discrimination faced by the 
Jews. Though some would not consider them to be a minority 
for equal employment opportunity purposes, Title VII does 
cover religion. It is also important to remember that color 
was not always the determining factor in discrimination. 
History provides many accounts of race discrimination. Due 
to the external environment, the only change was those who 
18°Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
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experienced its manifestation. 
In addition to management-loan programs, Inland 
instituted other programs. Cassel recalls several, one which 
was a joint program founded by one of his employees and a 
priest and another with Purdue University. 
The steel mills were booming in the 1940's, after 
World War II, and I came to Inland about 1948. And 
one of the first things we did was to start a school 
for Hispanics. We were getting a large number of 
Hispanics who couldn't pass simple entrance tests 
to come in and work for us. And the entrance test 
was essentially the ability to read signs, the 
ability to read stop and go signals, the ability to 
take care of yourself safely. The steel mill is a 
hard place in which to work, and you're always 
threatened with danger, and we had had too many 
fa tali ties. So it fell to me to get something going 
on that. I had a guy working for me, who came up 
with an idea - he and a local priest invented 
something called Dehon College. And between the two 
of them they got a college started for Hispanic 
families to teach the father the elements he needed 
in order to safely survive and promote whatever in 
and else, and to provide general know-how about the 
way life is lived in that community to the wives. 
The husband and wife went to the school together and 
we couldn't get the public schools to sponsor it and 
so we footed the bill. That ran for several years. 
And then we invented something else with Purdue 
University called The Technical Institute, and then 
the people went out of the Dehon College and into 
the Technical Institute to learn higher skills. 181 
Programs such as this benefited Hispanics and blacks. 
Cassel continues to emphasize why he felt companies developed 
such programs: 
IL. 
Yes, Hispanics [benefitted] mostly, but blacks went 
to the Purdue program too, as did whites, everybody 
did. But, I'm emphasizing something a lot of people 
181Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
wouldn't do. I think there was commitment, but 
there wasn't strong enough support up and down the 
line to do anything significant, on a race relations 
basis, until the labor shortage began to be felt. 
After World War II steel business really boomed. 
There was a pent up demand for steel during the war 
and we needed labor, and that did more to get people 
into the mills and get them started. We could use 
the argument, hey, we're short of people, we've got 
to do this. 
It wasn't done out of anybody's goodne~s. 182 
Management Union Relations 
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Inland' s di verse workforce made integration more 
difficult than if it had only one predominate race. The many 
ethnic groups, coupled with tenuous union relations, presented 
a challenge to Inland's management. Cassel spoke about this 
situation: 
IL. 
See there were about fifty ethnic groups in the 
plant, and most of them had strong nationalistic 
tendencies. And they tried to protect their own 
little turf away from some other ethnic group and 
frequently you would find foreman who were biased 
in favor of lets say Poles. And everybody in that 
department he had were Poles. So with the coming 
of the union and seniority, we began to get rid of 
that. 
Then you find some other foreman who would hire just 
Serbs. Serbs and Croations hate each other, even 
today, with a passion. 
Then we have political factions. And we had a blast 
furnace strike that ended all the wildcats. We had 
a wildcat going on in the blast furnace because of 
a guy named Archie Green who was trying to make a 
reputation for himself. So I went down town to see 
Randall and took Caples in with me, because he was 
my boss too. But I was making my own case. And I 
u
2Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
said "Look, we're going to keep on having wildcats 
unless we take these guys on." And this was about 
'53 or '54, and before I went downtown. And I said 
"I think I can make it in three days," it would take 
me three days to do it. The plant will be shut 
down, because if you shut the blast furnace down, 
it shuts the supply of iron off from the open 
hearth, and then that shuts the open hearth down, 
and that shuts down the supply of steel for all the 
rolling mills. So you've got a very key operation. 
So - and I'll never forget the way Randall said it 
to me - he said "Well o.k., but don't make any 
mistakes." 
Archie Green gave up, fortunately for me, within 
three days. They haven't had a wildcat since. 
They were mad at the bosses. Archie Green was also 
using it as a platform, to become president of the 
union. 
t 
So that in that case, I meant business, I wasn't 
even concerned about how Archie felt. 183 
Integration at the Management Level 
94 
Inland was not only concerned with integrating the 
workforce at the lower level, but equally concerned with 
achieving better representation at the management level. 
Cassel recalled an incident regarding people's reactions when 
he hired an Oriental for their research department: 
IL. 
Bill Caples and I hit upon the idea that we needed 
a little internal research group in order to see 
what we were doing. Everything was being done by 
the seat of the pants. There was no body of 
knowledge such as you can draw on. So we hired a 
research director. But then, one of the first 
applicants that came along was a Japanese. His name 
was Sam Onoda. The research director said "I want 
to hire this guy, he's good." So I said "Well lets 
hire him. " But my sixth sense said to me, we' re 
going to have problems, because I knew that mill, 
183Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
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like the back of my hand. I was in charge of 
industrial relations at the mill, during this time. 
So I called up Caples and said "Hey we got a 
Japanese guy. " Now to Caples credit, he never 
failed in these situations. He was always strong 
supporter. But his power was inadequate. But I 
asked him "What do you think?" I said, "Would you 
do me a favor and talk to Clarence Randall, and tell 
him what I'm gonna do?" Five minutes later he 
called back and said "Clarence says its o.k." 
So I had it lined up. I said, "You know we might 
have a strike on it." So he said "You can't have 
a strike on just hiring Japanese." So we put him 
on the payroll. I would say that within three days 
I had a delegation in my off ice of half a dozen of 
white collar workers from the accounting department 
They said, we refuse to work with Sam Onoda because 
he's Japanese. Now this is after World War II, so 
there's also racial tensions to it. They said they 
were going to walk out, they were going to strike. 
The whole accounting department, several hundred of 
them, were going to strike because we hired a Sam 
Onoda. 
So I said, "Well look, if you want to walk out, it's 
o.k. with us, we'll get replacements." And that 
really stopped them cold. They hadn't anticipated 
that kind of response, so they never walked out. 
They kept pestering a little bit. And it all quieted 
down. About six months later Sally Brown came to 
my office and said "Can we have lunch?" And she 
said, "I've gotten acquainted with Sam, and you know 
he's a pretty nice guy." 
This will give you some idea of people's hostility 
toward' s anybody brown, anybody yellow, anybody 
black. And that is the world in which we lived. 
Well, we used to take a personal beating in 
Industrial Relations from the operating guys. 
Because they said we were pushing this race stuff. 
We were pushing these people off on them. You'll 
find that time after time people felt that the law 
was bad, that they were being punished by the 
government. 184 
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Management Supports Efforts 
Cassel had the support of Mr. Caples and upper management 
in making hiring decisions which were considered to be 
unpopular. Despite the problems people such as Cassel faced, 
management support was present. When asked if he felt this 
support was symbolic or real, Cassel responded: 
I would have to say, in answer to your question, 
yes , we did have top management's support. We took 
a personal beating for adhering to a policy that 
wasn't formalized in the law. Remember this was 
before 1962 and 1963. And that's how Inland began 
to get a reputation in the community, in those 
years, as a liberal company that was out ahead. 
Well, we were out ahead/ because we were taking a 
terrible beating inside. Because Caples and I and 
a bunch of other guys who supported these policies, 
were very unpopular in some of those years. They 
even mistrusted us I think in negotiations - thought 
we would give something away in negotiations that 
would harm them. But you have to remember -that the 
people that felt most threatened in all of this were 
the low level people, foremen and the people just 
below, who were by and large first and second 
generation immigrants from Europe. 185 
In Kochan' s industrial relations model all elements react 
to the environment. As this process is taking place the 
developing system is taking its form from the individuals in 
control. In Inland's situation, individuals such as Caples 
and Cassel were progressive on their views of equal 
employment. Cassel shared his views on how the environment, 
and individuals such as Caples affected race relations at 
185Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
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Inland: 
It is related to kind of a freakish thing that 
happened. There were - Caples and I attracted 
people who were more liberal to the department. We 
were attracted to the top management, for different 
reasons perhaps, but I think they thought we could 
read and write and a few other things. But the 
fundamental thing was that the company's basic 
attitude revolved about the liberalism of these 
German Jews. I wouldn't have survived, nor would 
Caples. 
Going along with this there was a powerful change 
occurring in the labor management relations at the 
time he was hired and the time I was hired. Because 
prior to our time the labor relations at Inland and 
at Little steel was nothing short of awful. Inland 
was in the stage of conflict and containment. And 
when I went in to interview, Randall told me, "I 
want to change our policy. We don't want to be just 
plain anti-union." He said "This is the time for 
changing policy." He wasn't quite sure what that 
policy would be. But he had one problem. When I 
started work there in 1948, they were having a 
wildcat strike a day. And that was because of the 
decentralization of administration of justice to the 
foreman. That provided differential justice. In 
one department you could get hung for an offense and 
in another department you could get off scott free. 
The thing that the union ultimately brought and that 
Caples and I capitalized on was that the unions 
function with us was to help the workers get a 
modicum of justice. I was never under the illusion 
that the union would raise wages, but I was clear 
that they could provide justice to the workers. 
But the big thing that unions can bring and which 
continues to surprise me in the present milieu, is 
a sense of justice, and a reality of justice in the 
workplace, that they [workers] couldn't get 
otherwise. Because, without the union the employer 
is the judge, jury, the prosecutor and the jailor. 
He's everything. And there is no recourse. 
I used to tell my class about the fact that if you, 
walking down the street and you throw a brick in the 
window you get hauled off to the police station and 
they book you and they say "Well, get yourself an 
attorney." And they read you your rights. You go 
get an attorney and you appear before a judge whom 
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you've never seen and he decides whether you're 
guilty or not. 
But if at Inland steel you threw a brick through a 
window, you come to my department and we would judge 
you guilty, barn -- and there was no recourse. Well 
this was the shift. This is the profound shift in 
industrial relations that was occurring in that 
time, along with race relations. From what might 
be called containment and conflict, to what I felt 
was called arms length accommodation. Not too cozy, 
but still accommodating legitimate interests of 
workers and union. That was a profound change for 
us that we pretty much lead the industry in doing 
that. But it kind of accompanied the whole race 
relation things because these were all serious human 
problems that needed something more significant than 
rigid rule. 
And then the third thing that began to occur - it's 
about that time that the steel industry oligopoly 
began to break down. Now Caples never admitted, nor 
did Randall, admit we had an oligopoly. I say we 
had one. And I think most scholars will support us. 
What was interesting was - that the oligopoly had 
controlled the whole domestic market. The thing 
that began to break it down in the 50's were imports 
of steel from other countries. And the minute other 
players entered the game it began to weaken the 
oligopoly. 
Now the steel industry is still trying to preserve 
an oligopoly, but its having a terrible time doing 
it. Because the steel people in general, put their 
heads in the sand. 
But those three forces were occurring 
simultaneously, so that meant that as this oligopoly 
began to break down, the union could no longer 
depend as it had in the past on hooking its wage 
demands to fixed prices, that we passed along to the 
consumer. 
See, the union and the companies matched, not in so 
many words, but they were in the ball game together. 
If the company could pass prices on with no 
government appropriam or public outcry, or people 
unwilling to buy steel - the steelworkers were home 
free. All they had to do was to hook their wage 
increases to their price increases. That work~d 
pretty much through the 50's but began to break 
down. What's happened to the breakdown of that 
oligopoly is that its being broken down by domestic 
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competition and foreign competition both. 
But it's those three elements during those 50 's 
were very powerful elements that affected 
company and everything from there on. That was 
race relations thing and the business of . . . 
that 
the 
the 
Incidently Bill Caples and I went to the board of 
directors toward the end of the SO's and made a 
pitch to the board of directors that we start 
bargaining independently. In view of the fact that 
the oligopoly was no longer real, and that we could 
make a better bargain for Inland Ste.el with our 
union than U.S. Steel could with their union. And 
our board of directors would not recognize that the 
oligopoly was on its way out. 186 
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Unions and Race 
Unions had different positions regarding race relations 
' 
policies at this time. A few had mechanisms in place to 
counteract discrimination, others ignored the situation . 187 
Cassel shared his thoughts as to why this occurred: 
IL. 
In that period of time there were only two or three 
unions in the U.S. that were taking a lead, and they 
had terrible problems trying to take the lead. One 
was the United Autoworkers, under the leadership of 
Walter Reuthter; the other was the International 
Ladies Garment Workers; and the other union was the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers. 188 But most all the 
186Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
~For a general discussion of how unions discriminated 
against the black worker see generally, William. B. Gould, 
Black Workers in White Unions: Job Discrimination in the 
United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
188Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 258-259, 
describes UAW's participation in the fight for integrated 
housing. ; Jacobson, The Negro and the American Labor Movement, 
287, agrees that UAW was an exception. This was due to the 
fact that in the early years UAW already had a· large 
concentration of blacks. Therefore, they were more sensitive 
to "the Negro question." 
other unions felt it was too much of a hot potato 
to take on by themselves. There was no AFL 
position. George Meany felt that the only good 
plumber was a white plumber. 
Most of the guys that were in the leadership 
position of Local 1010 were white guys. There were 
beginning to be black guys in leadership. And the 
way they got there was through a very peculiar way, 
which is why blacks, and hispanics will get power. 
Segregation has a reverse twist. Blacks were 
segregated at the dirtiest, lousiest jobs in the 
mills - the blast furnace and the coke plant. I 
even interviewed a guy, who had the nerve to tell 
me that they put black guys in the coke plant 
because they were black! Coal was black, and they 
were black! I've had people with the nerve to tell 
me to put black guys in the blast furnace, because 
blacks stood heat better than other people! 
So the union had terrible internal problems. In 
fact, Walter Reuther had an internal revolt because 
he tried to make a woman a vice-president of the 
United Autoworkers in the 50's. So how energetic 
were they? They were as energetic as the blacks who 
had achieved power were. 
Now this is how they achieved power. By being 
segregated in the blast furnace they developed 
longevity and as they got longevity they developed 
knowledge and power inside the union. So the 
dirtiest, lousiest department like the coke plant, 
and the open-hearth and the blast furnace were 
tended to black dominated by black leadership. 
Gradually, they built up their power so that when 
they came to meetings they were able to be vocal. 
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When Walter Reuther, President of the UAW, resigned from 
the AFL-CIO's Executive Council, he criticized the 
Federation's failure in developing policies and practices 
regarding civil rights. He felt Meany was not committed in 
leading the AFL in this area and stated his leadership as 
being "the complaisant custodians of the status quo." 
Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer of the UAWU, resigned 
from the Civil Rights Committee of the AFL, saying it too had 
not done justice in eliminating racist practices in organized 
labor. ( 356) 
For a discussion as to why the ACWU and UAW were 
considered to be progressive also see, Richard A. Lester, As 
Unions Mature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 
89-95. 
They were the ones who were vocal and the ones who 
began to make the point. 189 
Many of the unions had discriminatory policies. 
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In a 
study conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 1968 regarding union 
practices, four specific discriminatory patterns emerged. 
They were: ( 1) no duty of fair representation; 190 ( 2) 
discriminatory seniority lists; (3) segregated locals, and; 
(4) exclusion of blacks from craft unions and apprenticeship 
programs . 191 Even though this study was not conducted until 
later years, Cassel spoke about how the unions failed to 
represent minority employees. When asked whether employees 
approached the union for representation, he responded: 
IL. 
Yes. And very frequently the local didn't handle 
them. I can give you two antidotes. 
One in case of a woman and one in case of a black 
who both came to see me when I was downtown, running 
industrial relations for the corporation. Both with 
identical stories, that they had taken their 
grievances against the management to the union and 
could get no satisfaction and said to me "Will you 
give us satisfaction?" The case of the woman was 
a rape case. And I gave her as much help as I could 
to get legal assistance to bring the charges that 
she felt she should be bringing. She couldn't even 
get the attorney, the county attorney to pay 
attention to her. 
189Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
190When a union is the exclusive bargaining representative 
for employees it is obligated to represent and process 
grievances on behalf of the members of that bargaining unit. 
191Benjamin W. Wolkinson, Blacks, Unions, and the EEOC 
(Lexington, MA: o.c. Heath & Co., 1973) 5. 
The black guy had a simple case of being 
discriminated against on the job. And so I called 
up the union and asked them to come in and I had 
the funny situation of being the mediator, between 
the union and the worker. And I did tell them that 
they would have lot of trouble in the future if they 
didn't start handling these cases. But they ignored 
the cases as much as they could.m 
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Based on this historical evidence Cassel responded to the 
issue of a slow and gradual turnaround in the use of 
minorities in union management: 
It was very, very gradual . It came around when 
there were a sufficient number of black guys in the 
union leadership. And that would have been in the 
'60's. Then the Hispanic guys would have somebody 
to go to. But there was nobody in the early years 
to go to. It was really pretty awful if you stop 
to think about it. 193 
Inland continued to respond to the government, union and 
its employees. The environment changed rapidly. White 
workers hostility towards blacks continued to grow, caused in 
part, by their fear of job competition. Inland' s human 
resources policies evolved in the midst of this racial 
tension. The success of these policies was due to individuals 
such as Caples and upper management's support. Caples, in 
turn, was able to stand by his people. The programs which 
were instituted were advanced for their times and were 
successful because they did receive the needed support from 
top management. 
192Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
193Frank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
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Corporate Social Policy 
In the early 1960's, when the Civil Rights Movement was 
gaining momentum, some companies voluntarily began taking 
affirmative steps towards developing policies and programs to 
assist them in integrating their workforce. Inland, is one 
of these companies. In order to see how a company got to 
where it is today, one must take a look at its past. 
Inland began taking affirmative action194 and providing 
equal employment for minorities for minorities and women long 
before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. Non-
discrimination clauses were found in almost all labor 
agreements beginning in 1962, but at least one was included 
as early as 1954. 1~ Article III, Section 4, of Inland's 1954 
labor agreement with Local 1010 and Local 64 stated: 
It is the continuing practice of both the Company 
and the Union that there shall be no discrimination 
against any employee because of race, color, 
religious, belief or national origin. 196 
Inland's corporate policies did in fact begin much 
earlier than the 1960's. In 1964 Inland was one of eleven 
194Affirmative action are affirmative steps which are 
taken beyond compliance to ensure there are remedies to 
eliminate discrimination. For example: career development 
programs, training in management skills and recruiting at 
predominantly minority universities. 
195Marshall, The Negro and Organized Labor, 187. 
19611 Agreement Between Inland steel Company and United 
Steelworkers of America Local Union No. 1010 and Local Union 
No. 64" Article III, Section 4, (Indiana Harbor, IN and 
Chicago Heights, IL, July 1, 1954), 4. 
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steel companies which signed and developed a "Plans for 
Progress." The company proceeded to develop programs and 
policies with which to increase the minority representation 
in the workforce. 
In the steel industry, minority representation in the 
skilled jobs was extremely low. These positions were filled 
through apprenticeship programs.~' In order to enter such a 
program tests had to be passed and certain requirements had 
to be met. In 1967, Inland became one of seven steel 
companies which conducted a pilot program to " . . lift the 
worker's educational levels to enable them to qualify for 
training and job opportunities when available. 11198 The program 
was in cooperation with the USWA and the federal government. 
The program was directed towards: 
. . • unemployed persons who might be hired for job 
openings available in the steel industry, but .. 
• do not meet the current educational or, perhaps 
the physical standards for acceptance that have been 
established by the companies. 
The second group are those who are already employed 
but who appear to be "locked in" at a certain level of 
educational development. Many of these individuals have 
voluntarily passed up job promotions when such were 
offered, or have been promoted to a better job only to 
find that they could not perform, because they could not 
read, or write well enough or do required arithmetic. 
Others have found occupational progression impossible 
because they speak a language other than English. 199 
197See, for example, United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
198Northrup, Negro Employment In Basic Industry, 328. 
199Ibid. 
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In 1971 Inland received a $1.6 million grant from the 
government to institute a JOBS Training Program in which 
hardcore, unemployed people were trained. In addition to this 
Inland also developed programs for minority engineers and 
technical students whereby financial assistance was awarded 
to students going into these areas. 
Inland was committed in the affirmative action area, as 
shared by Bill Dillon: 
The Blocks were very socially oriented people. Part 
of the whole philosophy was that before Civil Rights 
was popular they had that basic thrust of a 
management philosophy in which they gave everybody 
equal opportunity. 200 
Some people are more progressive than others, but the 
question remains, why and how does this happen. Dillon 
believed an individual's personal values and ethics could not 
be separated from their work ethic. In describing the Block 
family, he stated: 
IL. 
IL. 
I don't know where it really comes from, but it was 
just that everyone dealt with - Joe Block, Bill -
they all dealt with -they all had that very basic 
thrust, and they expected way before Civil Rights 
became popular - they expected their management 
people to be involved in civic and things. They 
were always encouraging us to do that sort of thing 
- to be involved. It was just something that they 
felt that way and they did it. 201 
200Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
201Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
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Inland's Human Resources Policies 
Inland had personnel policies in place for many years, 
some of which were negotiated with the union. Dillon 
commented: 
What you had with the union like this was that it 
was all negotiated. Most of those benefits - so you 
didn't really have a lot of leeway with respect to 
those benefits. They were negotiated - the insurance 
package, the pension package, the money package -
the incentives - all of that ... 
What we really had was the non-discrimination in 
employment aspect of it. Those were solid policies 
all the way back. And that is why when we got up 
to the 70's that was probably the most striking one 
of all. I worked in employment and I knew even in 
those days it was the br~nging in of people. There 
were plenty of jobs and everything was expanding. 202 
Executive Order 11246203 was one of the executive orders 
which was issued during 1965. One of the provisions in this 
executive order is that all federal contractors with federal 
contracts greater than $10,000 must have an affirmative action 
plan. 20• Dillon commented on Inland's affirmative action 
program: 
IL. 
It has been a commitment. When I was there we had 
a very solid affirmative action program. Where 
every year I was secretary and every year, every 
department has to come in and give their AAP showing 
us where they were last year; where they are this 
year; and if there has been no improvement, why 
hasn't there been any improvement. 
402Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
~3Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, as amended 
by Executive Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303. 
204Executi ve Order 11246 § 202 
We sat down with the heads of every operation, with 
the Chief Executive there, and with the top 
management guys that was part of the annual 
management review. The EEO numbers were part of 
that and I'm sure it still is.~5 
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Inland was already known to have instituted internal 
development programs. Cassel talked about a community program 
which Inland supported during the 1960s: 
When I was in Washington from 66-69 I was in charge 
of the Poverty Program, Youth Corp, Job Corp. We 
sent a young man, Roger Wilkins, to Chicago to talk 
to Mayor Daly about starting a Job Corp program here 
in Chicago. I was told to come up here and help him 
to try and get in to see the Mayor. Well, we 
finally did, but the Mayor was barely civil. We 
left there and went back to the Sherman Bar and 
said, "You know what we can do? Let's us have a 
really terrific Job Corp program for people. Why 
don't we have a really good job program." So I got 
a hold of Bill Barry who was head of the Urban 
League and I got a hold of Joe Block and said we 
need people at this Sunday Morning meeting. We've 
got to have a Jobs Now Program for the kids. By 
God, at the Sherman hotel we had a whole room full 
of people. Joe Block got them there, business men, 
and Bill Barry got businessmen and other there and 
we had the first Jobs Now Program started there. 
The point of the story is that I got terrific help 
all the way on this. All the way Inland was 
interested in these things. 206 
Inland had a long history of ci vie involvement. The 
company proved successful in establishing the Job Corp 
program. Such success dates back to 1955 when Edward Ryerson 
the Chairman of the Board for Inland was chosen as the first 
305Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
IL. 
mFrank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evan~ton, 
IL. 
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recipient of the annual Community Service award which was 
instituted by the Chicago Chapter of the Public Relations 
society of America. 20' In 1966 Inland was the recipient of the 
award. 20• This was the first time such an honor was bestowed 
to a corporation rather than to an individual. Inland 
continued other programs such as underwriting scholarships for 
minority students and developing joint programs with other 
companies to support the community. 
Inland: The Maverick 
For many years Inland has had the reputation of being a 
"maverick." Fighting for what the management believed in, be 
it fighting against wage increases or pensions; win or lose, 
gained the respect of both unions and its peers. David 
McDonald, United Steelworkers Union President in 1953 
described Inland as: " the maverick of the steel 
industry, an independent company with individual attitudes. 209 
Inland developed the reputation of being a "maverick" by not 
being a follower, but a leader. Bill Dillon shared his views 
of why Inland was given the name: 
In my experience with them - they always used to say 
"There's plucky old Inland." Abel used to tease us 
at the end. "Plucky old Inland, finally ..• " 
20'Ralph Campbell, "Employing the Disadvantaged: Inland 
Steel's Experience," Issues in Industrial Society 1 (1969): 
35. 
201Ibid. 
209McDonald, Union Man, 304. 
We were kind of a maverick in the sense that we got 
that reputation. Because you have U.S. Steel and 
Bethlehem and Republic. They were the big three and 
they made most of the major decisions in bargaining. 
And you would have Allegheny Ludlum, Youngstown, 
they would go along with what the big three wanted. 
They didn't fight them. At Inland We were always 
. if we didn't agree with the trend we were 
always fighting for "You shouldn't do this, you 
shouldn't do that." So that is where the idea of 
Inland being the "Maverick" was. Know we didn't 
have that much of an impact on the big three - U.S. 
Steel, Bethlehem, Republic - did almost what they 
wanted, but they had to keep the group together. 
So you had a certain amount of bargaining power. 
And what you do in those kind of bargaining stuff, 
is what you' re trying to do is protect yourself. 
You know U.S. Steel, Bethlehem and those guys, are 
going to do what they want, but you always gotta 
know, this is what they're going to do, but how is 
this going to impact me. So when I talk about this 
fighting, arguing with them, you were always trying 
to say, o. k. we do this, this is the impact on 
Inland. Lets do it a different way so that Inland 
doesn't get stuck. 
Abel always used to say in the end - "Oh geez, we 
finally got plucky old Inland to sign." But you see 
we were willing to challenge U.S. Steel and 
Bethlehem. Bill Caples and my predecessors and 
everything. And that is really what you are looking 
at in coordinated bargaining is to say how does this 
impact Inland differently so that we don't get 
banged with it. And they would bang us just as easy 
as they could. If we had some cost advantage over 
them - they would say what the hell are you talking 
about you're about to blow us in total employment 
costs. We're giving you the protection of a no-
strike and you're just fighting. 
That was always our role. You had to be very 
careful because just like in the EEOC, they didn't 
care what it cost Inland. 
But I think a lot of those guys at US Steel and 
Bethlehem admired us. We were mavericks in the 
sense in the EEO area. 
I'll always remember when I was Divisional 
Supervisor when the new galvanized lines came in. 
We had the old galvanized lines, which was the 
hardest job where you had sheet of steel and to dip 
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them in zinc by hand. A lot of these people were 
lowly educated minorities, mostly a lot of hispanic 
and black guys. When the newest stuff started 
coming in, the continuous stuff, a lot of the guys 
would say those guys can't do this, we've got to 
bring in educated people to run these lines. And 
we said that is a bunch of hooey. These guys have 
been running galvanized lines and they've got 
seniority rights for these jobs and we're going to 
train them to do the job. We never had any trouble. 
I remember the open hearth jobs, dirty, tough, 
heavy, high paying work, but you had a lot of 
minorities in those jobs, and when the new basic 
oxygen furnaces came in, we had the Japanese helping 
us with the technical end, and they couldn't believe 
that we were going to take the "Old Timers" and put 
them on these sophisticated equipment. They said 
it just can't be done. In Japan they would never 
think of that. So that in a sense that was one of 
the aspects that I remember. The equal employment 
type of thing that was to go ahead and push these 
guys. 
So this is why when we looked at those numbers this 
60-20-20 [60% white, 20% hispanic, 20% black] came 
about, because that had been the philosophy long 
before. This was in the 50's so when you looked at 
the numbers 20 years later, the numbers were 
there. 210 
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Bill Lowry, who in 1990 was still Director of Personnel 
and Recruitment, reiterated the fact that management was 
responsible for Inland achieving such a reputation. William 
Caples was a part of that team. Lowry remarked: 
IL. 
One year Inland resisted in raising prices, when the 
industry did. "Plucky old Inland." We gained 
respect. A lot of that has got to [go to] Bill 
[Caples]. Bill did a lot in identifying and hiring 
bright people. 
Inland was one of the first to go out and formally 
do college recruiting back in 1949. Clarence 
Randall started this. Inland demonstrated that kind 
210Bill Dillon, Interview on September 8, 1989, Chicago, 
of awareness very early in the game. Their 
participatory management style was somewhat new. 
Inland to me seemed to me to be a company with a 
conscience. And they tried to make their 
environment heal thy, so their company could be 
healthy. 211 
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The participatory management style was but one of the 
factors which made Inland successful with the community and 
its employees. Frank Cassel gives an in-depth analysis as to 
why the labor-management relationship went from being 
confrontational to becoming more accommodating. He also 
points out that their race relations policies was one of the 
reasons the company was considered a maverick. To this he 
replied: 
Lets go back to the three points I made earlier. 
A maverick partly because of the race relations, the 
early efforts there. A maverick because it more 
frequently in the industry tried to induce a 
different pricing policy on steel. 
Was it ever successful? No. You have the 
appearance of being a maverick, but not the reality. 
What people outside of Inland felt, was the high 
quality of labor-management relationship of 
accommodation, which was considered maverick. 
Because so many other employers, were pursuing 
outright hostility. What I realize, that also in 
this period, there is a great deal of history here, 
that tells you how we got where we were. 
After World War II we had a large number of strikes 
in the U.S., and those strikes, they usually occur 
after the war, because the rules and the 
relationships are usually suspended during wars. 
Then after wars, are loosened up. There were also 
something the during the war called the War Labor 
Board. And they imposed some conditions on the 
steel companies that they didn't like, including 
maintenance of membership, which is a form of union 
211Bill Lowry, Interview on July 13, 1989, Chicago, IL. 
shop. So the companies were ready for a fight after 
World War II. Not only in steel, but everywhere. 
And the unions were on the upswing. The unions 
basically reached their peak in membership as a 
percentage of the labor force in 1953-54. And they 
were very, very aggressive and on the make. The 
companies on the other hand, were equally obtuse. 
And it took the Little Steel Firms, like Inland, 
Republic and Jones and Laughlin and Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube, it took them by surprise when U.S. Steel 
Corp. signed a recognition agreement to steelworkers 
with John L. Lewis, who was head of the Mineworkers, 
and who had founded the Steelworkers Organizing 
Committee which succeeded the Amalgamated Iron & 
Steel & Tin Workers Union. So Little Steel was 
very, very hostile, and that included Inland. And 
at that time, the Republic Massacre occurred on the 
south side of Chicago, and that was between Chicago 
policeman and workers from Republic Steel. So 
Inland broke out of that pattern, broke out of the 
Little Steel pattern. 
Industrial Relations were much more rational in the 
sense than in the other Little steel companies, were 
much more like U.S. Steel. By the time we and U.S. 
Steel began talking about Industrial relations, we 
were thinking much more alike. In fact, I was a 
member of a three or four man committee strategy 
team for the whole industry to determine our 
strategy. One was U.S. Steel, one was Inland and 
the other was Republic, and one guy from Bethlehem. 
And we used to spend our days and weeks, plotting 
the strategies for each negotiation. But the major 
of their respect for Inland, was the fact we had 
membership on the committee that assisted a hundred 
steel companies. There were a 100 steel companies 
and twelve big ones. A little later Henry Kaiser 
dropped out and there became 11 big ones. Now there 
are only about six. 
But, Inland was thought a maverick in the community 
because it took seriously participation and serious 
problems. We were very early in inviting people to 
talk to our executives about how to deal with gang 
problems in Chicago. 
I became a member of the Urban League when the Urban 
League could have met in a telephone booth, and it 
was called a Communist organization in those days. 
So there I was representing Inland Steel at the 
Urban League. There were no other companies. We 
had very good rapport with our top guys and the top 
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guys were Randall and Joe Block. 
Inland helped me when I was in Washington, to get 
a very early version of the Job Corp underway. It 
was an experimental project here in Chicago and then 
we got it through Congress. Inland helped me get 
Roger Bough into my office to make an agreement with 
U.S. Steel Corporation, with the government to have 
to hire something 2-3000 or 10,000 - whatever the 
number was a year, disadvantaged young persons -
minorities. Inland helped me get those connections. 
I couldn't have knocked down the door and gotten 
Roger Blough to come by myself. And my boss, who 
was Secretary of Labor, couldn't do it·. 
We saw the role of the company in a much larger 
context. I wanted to mention something that's 
happened in defining what people do. The human 
resources term came alive in private industry in the 
1970's, but it really originated in government back 
in the 60's. When we were talking about it as a 
governmental function involving human resources on 
a very massive scale. And what they did was 
bastardized the term. And the idea of the human 
resources function was to cut out the union 
relationship. It's the mechanism for turning people 
around, so when they think of the function, they 
don't think of industrial relations, they think of 
human resources. Industrial relations includes an 
interaction of an outer environment or a secondary 
or tertiary, primary outer impact on the internal 
environment of the firm. The Inland internal firm, 
was profoundly affected, more than other firms, by 
the outer environment. Partly because of the top 
people; partly because of the people they hired; 
partly because of interest; partly because the times 
were changing; and we think we want to change. But 
there is no denying the fact, that the external 
environment was a powerful inf 1 uence on what we were 
trying to do. The company loaned me to the governor 
doing the first unemployment report in the country. 
This loan program I did in 1962 or 63, and companies 
weren't really doing this then. 212 
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Inland, justifiably so, gained the recognition of being 
a "maverick." The guidance and support which people such as 
mFrank Cassel, Interview on October 4, 1989, Evanston, 
IL. 
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William Caples, never faltered. The confidence the company 
displayed in making decisions resulted in admiration from its 
peers. 
The relationship between employees, union and management 
did not begin to improve until after the arrival of Caples in 
1945. Inland's new management new that it would have to hire 
people such as Caples to develop the industrial relations 
department. In order for it to be successful in developing 
its race relations policies and improving the union 
relationship, it needed to identify people who were equally 
committed to their goals. They found it in Caples' 
leadership, because he in turn hired others who shared that 
vision. 
CHAPTER 6 
CORPORATE CULTURE 
A pattern of basic assumptions--invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group as it 
learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration--that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and therefore, 
to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems. 213 
In the last several years corporations have been showing 
a greater interest in the subject of corporate culture. 
Studying a culture itself is not unique. Anthropologists 
study people in order to learn more about their values, 
beliefs and the society in which they live. These values and 
beliefs form a culture of society and corporations. 
In Kochan's model regarding the development of an 
industrial relations system, the external environment also 
plays a major role in how a corporate culture is developed. 
In both instances the external business or social environment 
is a great influence behind the evolution of either the 
culture or industrial relations system. Even though the 
mEdger H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership 
(San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Inc., 1984) 9. 
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external environment plays a large role in defining what the 
culture or industrial system will be, the underlying factor 
is that both of these are shaped by the leader of the 
corporation. To put this in a better perspective Figure 2 
describes Schein's three levels of culture. 
Artifacts and creations, Level 1, is the most visible 
level of culture. This level is the physical and social 
environment of the corporation. The outside world's opinion 
of a company's culture, is formed by their perception of what 
they see at this level. 
Culture reflects an individual or groups original values, 
Level 2. These values are derived not only from an 
individual's own values, Level 3, but also from the external 
physical and social environment, Level 1. Individuals are 
still aware of their values at Level 2, but they will draw 
from Level 1 and Level 3 when making a decision or leading a 
group of individuals. As values become more ingrained in an 
individual, they drop into the subconscious, becoming Level 
3, Basic Assumptions. These basic assumptions are derived 
from our relationships with other people and also from 
tradition. 
Culture reflects the values and assumptions by which 
decisions are made. In order to have a strong organization, 
the individuals making these decisions should share the 
organization's beliefs, values and vision. Upon examining 
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Figure 2 
Levels of Culture and Their Interactions214 
Level 1: Artifacts and Creations 
Technology 
Art 
Visible and audible behavior patterns 
/\ 
Level 2: Values 
Testable in the physical environment 
Testable only by social consensus 
,, 
Level 3: Basic Assumptions 
Relationship to environment 
Nature of reality, time and space 
Nature of human nature 
Nature of human activity 
Nature of human relationships 
214Schein' 14. 
Visible but 
often not 
decipherable 
Greater level 
of 
awareness 
Taken for 
granted 
Invisible 
Preconscious 
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culture more closely, one finds that leaders play a critical 
role in shaping the culture. If necessary, a good leader can 
successfully change the culture of a company so that it can 
better meet the needs of the external and internal 
environment. Successful leaders have been found to have 
certain skills and traits. Figure 3 summarizes 
characteristics found in a such a leader. 
Figure 3 
Traits and Skills Found Most 
Frequently to be Characteristic of 
Successful Leaders215 
TRAITS 
Adaptable to solutions 
Alert to social environment 
Ambitious and achievement 
oriented 
Assertive 
Cooperative 
Decisive 
Dependable 
Dominant (desire to 
influence others) 
Energetic (high activity 
level) 
Persistent 
Self-confident 
Tolerant of stress 
Willing to assume responsibility 
SKILLS 
Clever (intelligent) 
Conceptually skilled 
Creative 
Diplomatic and tactful 
Fluent in speaking 
Knowledgeable about 
group tasks 
Organized (administrative 
ability) 
Persuasive 
Socially skilled 
mDavid R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer and Ross A. Webber, 
Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management 
(Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1987), 556. 
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Inland Steel had strong leaders defining and molding its 
culture. In describing Clarence Randall, President of Inland 
Steel from 1949-1953 and then Chairman of the Board from 1953-
1959; and Joe Block President from 1953-1959, Cassel recalls: 
A great deal of these [trying to develop better 
union relations and equal employment opportunity] 
efforts got started under Randall, who preceded 
Block and as a matter of fact, he selected Joe Block 
as his successor. And Randall had an important 
character in this whole thing because of the 
evolution of his psyche, his personality. He had 
started out being the strongest anti-union leader 
in the industry , absolutely opposed to the union 
shop. He was a - he came to the company originally 
as a relatively rural lawyer from Ishpeming 
Michigan. He had been trained in the law at 
Harvard, was born and raised in Cherry Valley, New 
York. A man who continuously evolved throughout his 
life. And I think that two things that influenced 
him that influenced Inland, one was his service in 
Washington, with Eisenhower, where he came in 
contact with the bigger issues and the bigger 
problems of the world outside of Inland Steel, after 
all he was his Economic Advisor. And he got to see 
how important these issues were. Remember, that 
was from 52-58. And I observed in him an enlarged 
vision of the world. He wrote three or four books 
during that period of time. But he was the guy that 
Bill Caples on board, he brought me on board. But 
I don't underestimate the influence of the Blocks 
ethical values. Very high ethical values. You know 
its interesting, they are very consistent people. 
We ran into his daughter, and even today, they are 
involved in all the liberal causes. 
But Joe Block couldn't touch Randall for 
intellectual candle power. Randall had it. And he 
thought about all of these issues. He's the guy who 
thought a lot about these issues. He's the guy who 
thought consciously about changing the industrial 
relations policy of the firm. From outright 
hostility to something like accommodation. This is 
a big jump, because you have to train the whole 
workforce. Because this involves thousands of 
people - as a matter of fact I used to go out in the 
mills and talk to the guys I worked with. After I 
got downtown I'd go back to the mill and they'd say, 
"What's wrong with the old man, did he get taken 
when he went down to Washington? There's something 
wrong with this guy. He's got all these left wing 
views since he came back from Washington. " Left 
wing views from Eisenhower, can you imagine? They 
would trust me, they knew I wouldn't spill the 
beans. And he was very far advanced over everybody. 
In other words, if you talk about a push - pull 
effect, Randall was the pull effect. Of pulling 
that organization along into the 20th century, in 
technology, and in planning, and in race relations. 
All of those things, he was the pull effect. 
I remember he was very stern about having a plank 
to integrate the workforce. He fired a 
superintendent in one of the mills because he 
wouldn't come up with a plan. Randall was the first 
man to early adopt the ideas on having a planned 
succession of executives and so forth. Long before 
anybody else had. This man really had capability. 
Block carried out a lot of that, but not with the 
same flair or enthusiasm. It's an interesting 
thing, he had more of the feel of what the problems 
of the human race than Randall. Randall had a 
better intellectual comprehension of what to do. 
Block had more feelings. The Block couldn't escape 
the antecedents of their family and everything that 
goes into the life of the Jew who had connections 
with somebody who may have been in the holocaust or 
something. 
Randall was a cold blooded intellect who said, these 
are things that have got to happen. We have to have 
free trade, we can't be fooling around with all this 
goddamn protectionism. Block wouldn't have said 
that in a 100 years. Block went along with the rest 
of the guys on protectionism. 
We were the guys that were the instruments that were 
brought along, we were the guys brought in - given 
the green light. And we were not the guys who 
dreamed up the policy. The policy was there. 
With Randall there was something new everyday. He 
took on top issues. He took problems. He was 
wiling to work with the rest of the industry up to 
a point. He even acted as industry spokesman 
sometimes, but he had his own mind. Randall was a 
120 
121 
great orator. 316 
As much as a corporation needs a leader to form a culture 
it needs people to help it achieve success. Culture will get 
more deeply embedded and will perpetuate itself, through the 
individuals that are hired. According to Dillon, Clarence 
Randall hired quality people: 
He was given the credit for what we used to call the 
"Randall's Rangers." He had an approach that for 
steel you had to have top level management material, 
so every year Inland would recruit seven, eight, 
nine people, from the top schools, Northwestern, 
etc. - to get young talented guys put into these 
training programs to feed them into the management 
development system, so that you would have this top 
potential talent. And that proved very successful 
in those days that almost all of the guys came up 
to the top levels with Inland. So it was a very 
successful program. As far as getting the caliber 
of guys you needed for the top management level of 
the company. 
It was a very successful program, a lot of the 
people came through it. When I was at Inland, they 
were still bringing in a lot of very good people. 
They had guys like Barry Sullivan. They got some 
very good people that way. 
This was one of Randall's programs and this is why 
we called them "Randall's Rangers. 11217 
In analyzing leadership thus far, one of the major 
characteristics is the relationships which arise between the 
leader, his/her followers, the organization and the internal 
and external environment. Going one step further, the 
mFrank Cassel, Interview, on October 4, 1989, in 
Evanston, IL. 
211Bill Dillon, Interview on September 9, 1989, Chicago, 
IL. 
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foundation of these relationships all deal with people. A 
good leader will place a high value on people. Clarence 
Randall wrote: 
If your organization is run "by the book," if the 
job description is more important than the man, if 
organization charts take precedence over the 
realities of personal relationships, your 
organization is in danger of succumbing to an all 
too common form of creeping paralysis.m 
Randall's personal ethics and values did influence his 
business ethics, from his labor policies to social 
responsibility. His feeling regarding labor policies were 
that they should not be formulated by lawyers, but by: 
thoughtful management after weighing law, 
psychology, economics, and human values . . no 
individual will be permitted to substitute his own 
set of prejudices for the institutional 
philosophy. 219 
Randall firmly believed that the human resources function 
was important to a corporation, and did take the external 
environment into account when steering the company's course. 
The evolution of the labor relations policies reflect his 
values. The individuals he hired, such as William Caples, 
shared his beliefs and vision. They were able to move the 
company from confrontation to cooperation with the USWA, 
because they had his support. 
mclarence B. Randall, The Folklore of Mana9ement, 
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959), 12. 
ll9Ibid. I 47 • 
CONCLUSION 
The history of the steel industry's labor-management 
relations and race relations policies is cha.racterized by the 
turbulent period of the late 1800's when strikes were due to 
economics and quite frequently were violent. By the 1960's 
the violence remained, but this time it was related to civil 
rights. The government anq steel industry were equally 
experiencing a metamorphosis during these years. The course 
of events were consequently due to the changes in working 
conditions, technology and new legislation. 
Legislation which was passed during this time period went 
from being pro-union to pro-company The government also went 
to the extreme of taking a hands-off approach to seizing the 
steel mills. The New Deal labor policies legitimized the 
union and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proved to be the most 
important anti-discrimination piece of legislation to be 
enacted. A later chapter between the unions and companies 
could read that their relationship went from confrontation to 
cooperation. 
The environment created by World War I and II opened the 
door for the integration of the workforce. The labor shortage 
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forced companies to hire women and minorities for work in the 
factories. Unions, needing to increase their membership, were 
compelled to seek the black worker's support. Once this 
occurred, unions and companies had to develop new policies to 
address the inequalities which existed between the white and 
black worker. 
Title VII finally made unions and companies accountable 
for their race relations policies and the integration of the 
workforce. The legislation which was passed prior to 1964 
did not prove to be effective. The black workers had no 
recourse with which to seek redress ·for the racial 
discrimination they confronted in the employment sector. 
Unions were equally at fault by allowing segregated locals 
and discriminatory seniority and promotion provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements. But once created, policies 
were only successful when there was someone to support them. 
The evolution of Inland Steel's labor-management and race 
relations policies evolved during these very tumultuous times 
in the country's history. In 1938 the Chicago Memorial Day 
Massacre was fresh in everyone's minds and the management at 
Inland was considered to be "ruthless" and "dictatorial."2m 
Later, in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, effectively 
declared segregation in public education to be 
unconstitutional and the Civil Rights era gained momentum. 
220Whyte, Pattern for Industrial Peace, 157. 
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A corporation's management policies are determined by 
the internal and external pressures created by the 
environment. Such pressures are often times beyond the 
control of management. There are many extraneous factors, 
such as the fluctuating labor market, technological and 
economic changes which affect the development of policies. 
None of these factors, particularly governmental pressures, 
can be easily changed by management. Given these constraints, 
the fact remains that the top management of many companies was 
able to alter race employment patterns. Inland Steel was such 
an example. Individuals such, as William Caples and Clarence 
Randall left this type of legacy behind. The changes which 
ensued were not only a response to the changing external 
environment, but were also due to the commitment upper 
management had to its workforce. 
In 1954 Inland Steel introduced major technological 
modifications in the plants. These changes invariably began 
to lead to the displacement of senior employees. 221 The 
president, concerned with how these changes were effecting 
the older employees, informed his management that he wanted 
them to develop programs which could provide alternatives 
which would minimize the displacement. Management decided 
mFrank Cassel, "Corporate Manpower Planning and 
Technical Change at the Plant Level" (Amsterdam: Adjustment 
of Workers to Technical Change at the Plant Level 
International Conference, November 15-18, 1966), 4, 
photocopied. 
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the best approach was to develop training programs which would 
upgrade employees skills. The company continues to conduct 
training programs for their employees both at the plant and 
in conjunction with Purdue University. In addition, Inland 
executives and supervisors also receive training in planning, 
leadership skills, team building, group problem solving and 
worker participation. 222 
Further proof of Inland' s commitment to equal opportunity 
dates prior to the passage of Title VII. Inland was one of 
the companies which had voluntarily developed a "Plans for 
Progress." It was during this period the company instituted 
training programs for the black worker and began minority 
recruitment programs. The minority recruitment programs which 
are conducted at such universities as Howard and Florida A & 
M, are still in existence. In 1984 thirteen percent of their 
newly hired college graduates were minorities.u3 Recruitment 
programs such as this, are the result of Randall's program 
known as "Randall's Rangers." 
In addition to recruitment and training programs, Inland 
has also continued the legacy of community involvement. In 
1984 their foundation contributed $1, 573, 905. 224 Of this money 
forty-five percent was contributed to the United Way Community 
222Inland Steel, Inland Steel 1984 Annual Report (Chicago: 
Inland Steel, 1984), 15. 
223Ibid. 
22'Ibid. I 16. 
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Funds and thirty-six percent to educational institutions and 
scholarship programs. The scholarship programs involve 
scholarships given to minority students majoring in 
engineering and technology. The remainder of the money goes 
to community welfare agencies; local and national civic 
activities, such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League; 
and cultural organizations and hospitals. such programs and 
community involvement were begun under Randall's and Caples 
regime, and continue today. 
Both the labor-management 
integration of the workforce were 
relationship and 
finally solidified 
the 
by 
individuals such as William Caples and Clarence Randall. 
Randall had the foresight to see the need for an industrial 
relations department. When he hired William Caples, he hired 
someone who was committed to fair employment and willing to 
take risks. 
If a company is to survive it cannot close itself off 
from the world and complacently carry on its affairs. It is 
inseparable from the events occurring in the world. The 
corporation experiences what the world is experiencing. The 
two are intertwined and each must respond to the needs of the 
other. Inland Steel responded to the events which were taking 
place. 
The "Bill Caples" of Inland began developing race 
relations policies before it was mandated by law. Inland was 
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one of the few companies which incorporated the anti-
discrimination clause in their labor contracts as early as 
1954. The company was also excluded from the Steel Consent 
Decree which was signed with the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission in 1974.m By this time, the 
policies Inland implemented after 1945 had been in place long 
enough for the company to have a more representative workforce 
in nearly all occupations. In 1986 Inland's workforce was 
thirteen percent women, eighteen percent black and sixteen 
percent Hispanic. 226 During this same year the steel 
industry's employment characteristics were: thirteen percent 
women, ten percent black and eight percent Hispanic. 227 
Inland's company magazine states: 
" ... we believe that growth and profitability must 
be accomplished by other goals if we are to fulfill 
our obligations to the society we serve. Foremost 
among these objectives is providing an environment 
of equal opportunity in hiring, development and 
advancement . 228 
These statistics reflect Inland's commitment to this 
statement. The fact Inland' s internal representation is 
225For a list of the companies included in the Steel 
Consent Decree and the provisions of the Decree, see pp. 68-
70 below. 
226Inland Steel, 1986 Inland Steel Fact Book (Chicago: 
Inland Steel, 1986), 1. 
227U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employed Civilians by 
Detail Industry, Sex, and Race (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
January, 1987), Table 28. 
2~Inland Steel, Inland Steel (Chicago: 
1987) I 3. 
Inland Steel, 
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greater than the steel industry's is due to the programs which 
were instituted between 1949 and 1969 and continue today. The 
training and development programs have increased the 
promotional opportunities for minorities. These programs, in 
addition to the company's hiring practices, have thus resulted 
in the increase of minority internal representation. None of 
this would have occurred if there had not been suitable 
management to initiate the needed changes. 
The future progress of equal employment opportunity will 
continue to depend in part, as it has in the past, upon the 
managers commitment to equal e~ployment opportunity. Everyone 
operates within certain constraints which are imposed by the 
internal and external pressures. In turn, it is these 
pressures that bear upon the organization and operation of a 
business. As Kochan's industrial relations model 
demonstrates, the external environment, coupled with history 
and the values of a company, create an industrial system. 
In 1964 Clarence Randall wrote: 
The world moves on passing from one area of 
turbulence to the next, with the problems of today 
steadily yielding place to those of tomorrow. . 
For this reason there can never be a neat handbook, 
to be kept in a desk drawer, that will give all the 
answers . . . success lies in bringing fresh wisdom 
to new situations. 229 
When Randall hired Caples in 1945, he hired an individual 
with wisdom and someone who was innovative and willing to take 
229Clarence Randall, Making Good in Management (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964), 151. 
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risks. Cassel said in his interview that race relations was 
viewed as a "hot potato" and that not many companies were 
willing to address it. Inland did address it with the help 
of people such as Caples and became known as a leader because 
of the policies which were instituted between 1945 and 1969. 
Due to Bill Caples and the support of upper management these 
policies were, and continue to be, successful. 
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